Although the number of patent applications and patent authorizations in our country has increased steadily, a large number of patents have not been implemented to gain technical advantages or economic benefits, which not only wastes social resources but also hinders the creation of a positive innovation atmosphere across society. Currently, our country is focusing on high-quality development as the thread of work, vigorously developing new quality productivity. This background underscores the importance and urgency of patent transformation and application, as the implementation of patents can supply technological achievements to the market and promote societal industrial transformation. The fourth amendment to the Patent Law of the People's Republic of China added a patent open licensing system. After preliminary pilot experiments, the implementation of the open patent licensing system is now being fully advanced.
The patent open licensing system is a normative system supported by administrative authorities to encourage patentees to actively participate in the transformation and application of patents through licensing, to complete the matching of technology supply and demand, and to achieve the goal of market-oriented allocation of factors. The system incentivizes patentee participation with reductions in annual fees, increases transaction efficiency with standardized licensing conditions, and ensures the smooth operation of the system through the intervention of public power. Universities and research institutes have great potential for patent technology innovation but a low rate of patent transformation, so they are a key target for incentives under the patent open licensing system. The establishment of the patent open licensing system is not only to meet the current needs of patent transformation, but also reflects China's determination to improve the quality of patents and further enhance the national overall innovation level.
In order to ensure the patent open licensing system can fully exert its incentive effects and at the same time make the system consistent with the national long-term development goals, this paper conducts a comprehensive and in-depth analysis of the content of the system: (1) The provisions regarding licensing fees do not conform to patent transaction practices, which may suppress the enthusiasm of domestic and international entities to participate. (2) Reductions in annual fees are an important means to attract patentees to make patent open licensing declarations, but legal provisions are still uncertain and may induce moral hazard. (3) The implementation of the patent open licensing system at every stage cannot be separated from the support and guidance of administrative authorities, but currently, the functions of administrative authorities lack clear stipulations, which may lead to improper government intervention in the market. To reduce conflicts between specific measures within the patent open licensing system, it is necessary to adjust and optimize the patent open licensing system from the perspective of systems theory, specifically focusing on three aspects: the system's philosophy, structure, and specific measures.
This paper advocates the following conclusions: First, the patent open licensing system undertakes the task of promoting the transformation and application of patents in the short term, but it should also aim for long-term goals of improving patent quality and fostering an ecosystem of high-quality innovation. Second, during the implementation of the system, administrative authorities should respect the laws of market operation, avoid interfering with the autonomy of the parties, and retain space for autonomous negotiation for the parties. There should be a formal review of open licensing declarations, an information disclosure system for ex post supervision, and a strengthening of the connection with the patent examination and patent invalidation systems. Third, the proportion of annual fee reductions should be set within a certain range, with differentiated reductions based on the implementation of patents. To prevent open licensing parties from speculating and arbitraging, and to filter out low-quality patents, a mechanism for the return of annual fees should be added, comprehensively examining the subject's subjective intentions, objective actions, and the implementation of patents, setting different amounts of annual fee returns, and pairing them with other types of punitive measures. Fourth, administrative authorities should strengthen their service functions and guide patentees to pay attention to the benefits through patent use through diversified measures, and better balancing the interests of patentees and licensees.