It is well acknowledged that technological innovation is the key means for enterprises to maintain and improve competitiveness. Upper echelons theory posits that managers′ characteristics affect enterprises′ strategic choices,which in turn impact organizational performance. Managerial long-termism is systematic strategic thinking based on long-term value promotion as the key decision-making criterion and ensures that core stakeholders make strategic decisions and select operational behavior around the long-term value of the enterprise. However,there are few studies investigating how executives′ temporal preferences affect corporate technological innovation. Thus,it is of great theoretical and practical significance to clarify the internal mechanism of the relationship between managerial long-termism and corporate technological innovation. Meanwhile,in the digital economy era,the booming digital economy has become an important support and key engine for promoting high-quality economic and social development. With the development of the digital economy,many enterprises have embarked on the road of digital transformation. Therefore,this article further explores the moderating effect of digital transformation on the relationship between managerial long-termism and corporate technological innovation.#br#This paper takes the A-share listed companies on the main board from 2010 to 2021 as the research sample,constructs the proxy variable for managerial long-termism through machine learning and text analysis methods,and then explores the mechanism of managerial long-termism affecting corporate technological innovation and the moderating effect of digital transformation. The results show that managerial long-termism significantly promotes corporate technological innovation,mainly through the two mediating paths of alleviating the principal-agent problem and improving the quality of internal control. Digital transformation plays a moderating role in the process of managerial long-termism affecting corporate technological innovation,that is,the greater the intensity of digital transformation,the more obvious the promotion effect of managerial long-termism on corporate technological innovation,and the moderating effect of digital transformation will be even more obvious under the circumstances of granting managers equity incentives and high levels of external market competition.#br#The contribution of the study is threefold. First,combined with the time-orientation theory and upper echelons theory,this paper theoretically explains the mechanism of managerial long-termism on corporate innovation. From the perspective of alleviating the principal-agent problem and improving the quality of internal control,it reveals the path of managerial long-termism in corporate technological innovation,makes up for the lack of existing research on managerial time preference,and expands the research on managers' traits in the field of innovation management. Second,it verifies the moderating effect of digital transformation in the process of managerial long-termism promoting enterprise innovation,clarifies the logical relationship between "people" and "technology" synergy on enterprise technological innovation,and effectively responds to the possible paradox between digital transformation and enterprise innovation. Third,from the perspective of variable construction,machine learning and text analysis are introduced into the research on managerial long-termism. This method of variable construction effectively overcomes the limitations of the subjectivity of questionnaire surveys and the indirectness of secondary data measurement and provides a new idea for the measurement of managers' temporal traits.#br#The practical implications are then proposed. First,enterprises should improve the long-term-oriented selection and training mechanisms. The factors of managers′ temporal preference should be considered when forming the top management team,and the long-termism tendency of managers should be cultivated in the process of improving and developing the top management team. Second,in light of the current macroeconomic conditions and the operating conditions of local companies,relevant government departments should issue support policies to help firms adapt to the trend of the digital economy and seize opportunities to actively carry out digital transformation so as to give full play to the co-governance function of digital transformation and managerial long-termism in the process of promoting enterprise technological innovation. Third,enterprises should actively grant equity incentives to long-termist managers to better stimulate the endogenous power of technological innovation. Equity incentive models,prices,deadlines,conditions and other contract elements should also be reasonably designed with the main criterion of shaping managerial long-termism to alleviate the possible "double-edged sword" effect,truly promote the interests of managers and shareholders,and achieve the original intention of equity incentives.#br#
Xu Ning
,
Zhang Di
,
Li Xiaoqi
,
Zheng Fang
. How Managerial Long-Termism Promotes Corporate Technological Innovation: The Moderating Effect of Digital Transformation[J]. Science & Technology Progress and Policy, 2024
, 41(11)
: 120
-129
.
DOI: 10.6049/kjjbydc.2023030449
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