Innovation is the internal driving force of high-quality economic development and the inevitable requirement of entering a new stage of development. Strategic emerging industries play an engine role in high-quality economic development, and thus how to encourage listed companies in strategic emerging industries to carry out R&D innovation is of great significance. Due to the high uncertainty of R&D and innovation activities and the long R&D cycle, the problems of financing difficulty and high financing costs have become the main factors that restrict the technological innovation of technology-based enterprises. Engaging in innovation activities cannot yield rich economic benefits in the short term, and there is a huge risk of failure, leading to the lack of sufficient willingness of enterprises in the strategic emerging industries to invest in research and development.#br#The pilot work of promoting the integration of science and technology and finance aims to break through the financing constraints, promote enterprise innovation and the transformation of scientific and technological achievements, and boost the development of strategic emerging industries by integrating the diversified resources of science and technology and finance, including venture capital, multi-level capital markets, bank credit, etc. In order to encourage enterprises in strategic emerging industries to carry out R&D and innovation, the Chinese government has formulated a variety of industrial policies and issued public R&D and innovation policies including R&D subsidies and tax incentives. Thus the existing literature has carried out extensive empirical research on whether the innovation incentive policies can effectively stimulate the innovation of enterprises. Some research holds that these policies have a significant incentive effect on enterprise R&D and can significantly leverage enterprises to invest in R&D; others argue that due to the information asymmetry between the government and enterprises, policy risks may be triggered, leading to strategic innovation and even R&D manipulation by enterprises to defraud R&D subsidies or tax incentives, thus significantly reducing R&D performance. Furthermore, there is still a lack of research on whether technology finance policies will stimulate research and development manipulation by listed companies in strategic emerging industries.#br#With the aid of the quasi-natural experiment of the pilot policy of combining science and technology with finance, this paper constructs a multi-point difference model using data from strategic emerging industry enterprises from 2008 to 2019, and empirically analyzes the impact and internal mechanism of science and technology and finance policies on the R&D performance of listed companies in the strategic emerging industries from the perspective of R&D manipulation. It is found that the science and technology financial policy significantly suppressed the R&D manipulation behavior of listed companies in strategic emerging industries, thus significantly improving their R&D performance. The results of a series of robustness tests, such as the parallel trend test and placebo test, show that the research results are highly robust. The results of heterogeneity analysis show that the inhibition of S&T financial policies on R&D manipulation is more significant in state-owned enterprises, enterprises in the eastern region and enterprises with long listing years.#br#With regard to the contributions of this study, the following two points are summarized. First, from the perspective of R&D manipulation of listed companies in strategic emerging industries, the implementation effect and mechanism of the pilot policy of science and technology finance are evaluated for the first time, and the specific mechanism of the research on the policy effect of science and technology finance policy is deepened and expanded from the perspective of financing constraints and tax incentives. Second, this paper examines the differential impact of the pilot policy of science and technology finance on the R&D manipulation of listed companies in strategic emerging industries with different property rights, regional economic differences and listing years, thus revealing the boundary conditions of the implementation effect of the pilot policy of science and technology finance, helping to improve the implementation of the pilot policy of science and technology finance, and providing empirical evidence for the further promotion of the pilot policy of science and technology finance across the country.#br#
Zeng Zhuoqi
,
Wang Yue
. The Impact of Science and Technology Financial Policy on the R&D Performance of Listed Companies in Strategic Emerging Industries: The Perspective of R&D Manipulation[J]. Science & Technology Progress and Policy, 2024
, 41(6)
: 149
-160
.
DOI: 10.6049/kjjbydc.2022090151
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