The “Type-R” succession is a new family governance phenomenon that is passed down from non-family CEOs to family CEOs. It is found that family firms that experience “Type-R” successions have better performance because the family CEO and the non-family CEO are consistent in the pursuit of performance goals, and family CEO could inherit the market-oriented institutional designfrom the previous non-family CEO, and the “Type-R” succession brings out the complementary strengths of both professional managers and family CEOs. However, as family firms are not only concerned with financial goals, but also with the family's socio-emotional wealth, this paper focuses on whether the “Type-R” succession also contributes to the family's emotional wealth goals.#br#Green innovation is an important strategic initiative for family firms to pursue their emotional wealth goals. This paper compares and analyzes the differences in green innovation between “Type-R” succession and “non-Type-R” succession family firms in a sample of listed family firms from the pollution industry in China from 2009 to 2021. The benchmark regression results indicate that “Type-R” succession reduces the transformation efficiency of green innovation, which in turn reduces green innovation output. The results of the mechanism test indicate that the active departure and tenure of non-family CEOs reinforce the conflict logic and strengthen the inhibitory effect of “Type-R” succession on green innovation.#br#The primary contribution lies in the following aspects. Firstly, this paper enriches the research on the impact of R-type succession by extending the impact of “Type-R” succession from financial performance to socio-emotional wealth. Secondly,it expands the literature on the relationship between family CEOs and green innovation by confirming the negative role of “Type-R” succession in green innovation efficiency. Thirdly, it enriches the study of the boundary conditions of the impact of “Type-R” succession, and further validates the mechanism by which the “Type-R” succession conflicts work.#br#According to the research conclusions, the following practical implications are drawn. Chinese family firms are currently at the peak of generational change, and it is not uncommon for professional managers to be hired as CEOs of family firms. The findings of this paper have a strong reference value for family firm CEOs to improve the efficiency of the transformation of corporate green innovation resources. On the one hand, in the consideration of maintaining the emotional wealth of society, preserving family reputation and achieving family legacy through strategic initiatives such as green innovation, family firms should take into account the impact of the legacy of the previous professional manager in the selection of family successors. On the other hand, when bringing in a professional manager to manage a family business, the family firms need to have full trust in the managers and avoid interference from family nepotism in the day-to-day management of the professional manager. However, there are some limitations in this study that may provide insights for future research. Firstly, “Type-R” succession as a particular model of succession may have an impact on the effects of other strategic decisions oriented towards emotional wealth in family firms, but this is not explored in this paper. In future research, alternative scenarios of family emotional wealth (e.g., fulfillment of community responsibility, etc.) could be considered to further test the conflicting mechanisms and their causes in this paper, or to explore the effects of other mechanisms of action on the effectiveness of corporate strategies. Secondly, the findings from western research suggest that there is congruence between family CEOs and non-family CEOs in the pursuit of performance goals, and that family CEOs inherit the institutional design inherited from the previous non-family CEOs. In this situation, “Type-R” succession brings into play the complementary strengths of both professional managers and family CEOs. However, in the Chinese context, the market for professional managers needs to be improved, and there is still uncertainty as to whether the institutional design of professional CEOs will be accepted by their successors. Therefore, the issue of whether the complementary effect of “Type-R” succession on performance objectives still exists in the Chinese context and awaits further research.#br#
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