Since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, the state has attached great importance to the innovation-driven strategy, and pointed out that innovation should be placed at the core of national development and that key technologies should be in our own hands. As the main body of technological innovation, enterprises' innovation achievements are largely affected by the types of innovation activities. Innovation activities are divided into exploratory innovation and utilization innovation according to their risk sharing and resource utilization. Exploratory innovation is related to the long-term development of enterprises, and utilization innovation is related to the short-term development of enterprises. As the executive team of the enterprise, how the CEO's power affects the choice of the enterprise's ambidextrous innovation strategy has important practical significance. In addition, most of the existing scholars' research focuses on the relationship between CEO power and corporate innovation investment, and often regard innovation as a homogeneous activity, and take CEO power as a single variable to analyze its impact on corporate innovation. The conclusions are often divergent. This paper distinguishes the dimension of CEO power and the heterogeneity of innovation, and introduces the moderating effect of two internal and external factors, the level of marketization and internal control to clarify the inconsistent relationship between CEO power and corporate innovation in previous articles. The reason has certain theoretical value.#br#This paper takes the marketization level and internal control as moderating variables , and uses the CSI high-tech enterprise index constituent stocks from 2014 to 2017 as the data to establish a multiple linear regression model to study the relationship between the CEO's power intensity and the enterprise's ambidextrous innovation investment decision. The following conclusions are drawn. (1) CEO power intensity promotes enterprise innovation investment. (2) By subdividing the dimension of CEO power intensity, it is found that structural power has a more significant inhibitory effect on exploratory innovation investment than utilization innovation investment, and ownership power, expert power and reputation power have more significant promoting effect on exploratory innovation investment. (3) Compared with exploratory innovation investment, the moderating effect of marketization level on CEO power intensity and exploitative innovation investment is more significant; compared with exploitative innovation investment, internal control The moderating effect on CEO power intensity and exploratory innovation investment is more significant.#br#This paper combines CEO power with ambidextrous innovation investment, takes CEO power intensity as the starting point, studies the effect of various dimensions of CEO power intensity on enterprise ambidextrous innovation investment, and considers the multi-dimensionality of CEO power and the heterogeneity of enterprise innovation to explore the reasons for the inconsistent relationship between CEO power and corporate innovation in previous studies. This paper adds the moderating role of marketization level and internal control, considers the factors that affect CEO strategy implementation from both internal and external aspects, deconstructs the role path of CEO power intensity affecting the enterprise's dual innovation investment, and verifies the marketization level and internal control adjustment effect. This study combines principal-agent theory and resource dependence theory with higher-order theory to explain the relationship between CEO power intensity and enterprise ambidextrous innovation investment, and strengthens the explanation of higher-order theory in the field of enterprise ambidextrous innovation.#br#This paper has the following innovations. Theoretically, this paper provides important practical significance for the ambidextrous innovation management of Chinese enterprises. Enterprises can adjust the various dimensions of CEO power intensity to change the investment in ambidextrous innovation. Enterprises choose areas with high marketization level to increase the enterprises' exploitative innovation investment and they can improve the internal control system to increase the investment of exploratory innovation.Practically, this study combines principal-agent theory and resource dependence theory with higher-order theory to explain the relationship between CEO power intensity and enterprise ambidextrous innovation investment, and strengthens the explanation of higher-order theory in the field of enterprise ambidextrous innovation. This paper provides practical guidance for companies to use CEO power to adjust the level of ambidextrous innovation investment.#br#
Shao Yinghong
,
Ding Qin
,
Bao Qing
. CEO Power Intensity and Enterprises' Ambidexterity Innovation Investment: the Moderating Role of Marketization Level and Internal Control[J]. Science & Technology Progress and Policy, 2022
, 39(4)
: 131
-140
.
DOI: 10.6049/kjjbydc.2021020220
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