Considering the Cognitive difference of innovation degree, this paper builds a model to study the licensing contracts mechanism, which an outside innovator sells its horizontal product innovation to one or two firms who compete a la Cournot Under incomplete information.It finds that fixed-fee contract is not always superior than royalty contract to the licensor considering the cognitive disadvantage.In two-part tariff contract, cognitive difference distorts the innovator’s choice from exclusive licensing to non-exclusive licensing.Cognitive difference weakens the licensor's market power, which enhances the advantage of royalty contract.Auction and equity investment contracts are helpful to avoid the influence of incomplete information.It is suggested that the innovation patentee should clarify the long-term return and apply a variety of licensing contracts.To maximize profit with the technology industry chain mutual inclusion of incentives, non-exclusive licensing strategy is adopted to cooperate with royalty, two-part tariff, equity investment contracts, which promotes the application of technological innovation, and improves social welfare.
Wang Junmei
,
Wang Qiaoling
,
Yang Yongdong
. Researchon Licensing a Horizontal Product Innovation Considering the Cognitive Difference of Innovation Degree[J]. Science & Technology Progress and Policy, 2021
, 38(7)
: 134
-140
.
DOI: 10.6049/kjjbydc.2020050267
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