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| How to Generate a Commander：On the "Selecting-Determining-Assuming the Best Cadidates" Mechanism of Jie Bang Gua Shuai System |
| Zeng Jingjing1,2,Shi Yongdan1,Huang Guihua1 |
| (1.School of Public Administration,Zhongnan University of Economics and Law;2.Innovation and Talent Base for Income Distribution and Public Finance,Zhongnan University of Economics and Law,Wuhan 430073,China) |
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Abstract The competition of comprehensive national strength is the competition of scientific and technological innovation. It′s also the competition of innovative talents. In the context of increasingly fierce international competition,it is a core issue for China to maintain a competitive advantage through innovation-driven development.High-level scientific and technological talents are the key to facilitating the self-reliance of technology. Therefore, it is worth of considering how to attract talents in the process of technological research and innovation development.#br#In the above context, the central government has proposed and emphasized that we can explore and engage in the system of “Jie Bang Gua Shuai”which refers to a strong and open competition mechanism for selecting the best candidates to lead key research projects, with chief technology officers assuming responsibilities. The “Bang” reflects the demand for key technologies, and “Shuai” refers to the chief technology officers. Therefore, “Jie Bang Gua Shuai” is an important system to attract, select and motivate talents to participate in the research of key technologies. However, there is very little academic research on how to promote the participation enthusiasm of potential candidates and select the best candidate for a project.Different from the existing research which focus on the talents′ willingness and behavior to participate in the project from a micro perspective, this paper mainly discusses the selection criteria, organizational and assurance measures from the perspective of macro-policy and institution.#br#In order to give full play to the advantages and ensure the effectiveness of the system, based on the policies issued by the central and local governments and the practices of local governments, this study takes the best candidates in the open competition for key research projects as the research object and follows the logical framework of “selecting-determining-assuming the best candidates” to analyze the key points of the system at each stage in detail. The selecting mechanism is the foundation to ensure the quality of the candidates. The determining and assuming mechanisms guarantee their problem-solving efficiency. Together with the three mechanisms, it can be ensured that the candidates are capable ofthe key research projects. The core issue of the selecting mechanism is “how to select the best candidates” mainly from three aspects: threshold conditions, integrity conditions and R&D capabilities. The core issue of the determining mechanism is “what the most effective way is to compete for thekey research projects”. According to the competition and cooperation relationship between the candidates and the characteristics of the project, this study proposes three kinds of competition forms: independent competition, joint competition, many-to-one competition and one-to-one competition. The core issue of the assuming mechanism is “how to ensure that the technology officers can focus on the scientific research after they win in the competition”. In order to achieve the object, the technology officers should be given some rights, such as achieving the corresponding rewards, being granted with the fault tolerance and guarantee mechanism, as well as a certain degree of autonomy, clearing the ownership of intellectual property rights, communicating with the demander and other competitors. In this way, the continuity of their research can be ensured and they will be encouraged to do their best to overcome the difficulties of key technologies. In addition, in terms of capital supply, this study suggestsadhering to the principle of diversification, taking the supporting funds provided by the demander or the best candidates as the main source, supplemented by government financial support, and guiding financial capital, social capital and other channels for investment. These measures help to optimize the financial support environment and provide material guarantee for thebest candidates to overcome key technical problems.#br#There is still a lot of room for research on the system of “Jie Bang Gua Shuai”in the future, including how to ensure the quality of the candidates without compromising their enthusiasm,tolerate their failures, and prevent the speculative behaviors. Moreover with the gradual deepening and further operation of this system, it is feasible to provide strong arguments for selecting, determining, and assuming the best candidates more efficiently by a large amount of case study. This study provides theoretical guidance for the “selecting-determining-assuming” of the best candidates in the application and demonstration stage; at the same time, it serves the practice of talent selection, and provides theoretical guidance for attracting and screening the best candidates for technical research and facilitates the self-reliance of high-level technology.#br#
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Received: 15 January 2022
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