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| How to Reduce the Incidence of Corruption in Science and Technology Administrative Approval |
| Pan Yanjie1,Zheng Feihong2 |
| （1.School of Law, Anhui University;2.School of Economics, Anhui University, Hefei 230601,China） |
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Abstract Without effective institutional constraints, science and technology administrative review and approval is highly likely to lead to corruption. The path coefficients of the structural equation modeling were fitted by establishing the mechanism model of correlation between the science and technology administrative examination and approval and the incidence of corruption, and by correlation analysis, internal consistency and EFA test, and second-order validation factor analysis. The results show that, market incentives can directly affect the incidence of corruption, both command control and market incentive can breed negative and corrupt public service motivation and thus generate corrupt behavior, the external influence brought by the improvement of marketization degree is more significant than the internal variation of public service motivation on the increase of corruption incidence. The financial, In view of the different types of administrative examination and approval of science and technology, implement differentiation of corruption prevention and control mechanism, personnel for examination and approval of public service motivation, blocking the corruption in the mediation, deepening the reform of administrative examination and approval system of science and technology, pushing forward the construction of the institutionalization, standardization and normalization of examination and approval to streamline optimization technology of administrative examination and approval process, improve the intensive degree of examination and approval, reversed transmission to performance reduce the incidence of corruption.
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Received: 19 November 2019
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