在奋力实现共同富裕的背景下,如何有效发挥薪酬的激励效应,通过创新推动社会发展是重要而迫切的研究议题。以2008—2021年沪深A股上市公司为样本,从纵向和横向两个维度实证检验薪酬差距对创新动力的影响。结果发现:内部薪酬差距与企业创新动力存在显著倒U型关系;高管外部薪酬差距对创新具有正向促进效应,普通员工外部薪酬差距与创新动力具有倒U型关系;外部薪酬差距具有显著的创新动力动态效应。
In the process of China's modernization, it is necessary to adhere to "innovation-driven development, comprehensively shaping new development advantages", and take into account the interests of all parties to achieve common prosperity.The core of innovation is the process of integrating human capital with corporate resources.Therefore, a reasonable and effective incentive mechanism is an important catalyst for innovation.Compared with other incentive methods, pay incentives have a more significant base effect.In recent years, one of the frontier issues in international academia has been the cross-study of labor economics and corporate finance, and the impact of executive pay incentives on innovation is an important topic.Some literature also focuses on the essential role of ordinary employees as stakeholders in innovation activities.However, there is still significant controversy about the impact of pay dispersion on innovation, and a consensus has not been reached.#br#Due to the complexity of clearly attributing innovative achievements and the fact that pay dispersion has a direct effect, this paper constructs a comparative framework for pay dispersion that includes both executives and ordinary employees, and measures the pay dispersion at internal and external levels, i.e., the average salary gap between executives and ordinary employees within the company, the gap between the average salary of executives and the industry, and the gap between the average salary of ordinary employees and the industry.The study uses data from A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2008 to 2021 (excluding financial companies), and 27 042 valid research samples are obtained mainly from the National Tai'an Database (CSMAR).Innovation drive reflects short-term innovation willingness, and the greater the innovation motivation, the greater the corresponding innovation investment.Then it establishes a model with innovative drive as the explained variable and pay dispersion as the explanatory variable to empirically test the impact of pay dispersion on corporate innovation.#br#It is found that (1) there is a significant inverted U-shaped relationship between the internal pay dispersion between executives and ordinary employees and the corporate innovation drive.The maximum innovation drive of the enterprise is achieved when the average salary of executives is 14.88-17.46 times that of ordinary employees.(2) Moreover, external pay dispersion for executives has a positive promotion effect on innovation.The external pay dispersion of ordinary employees has an inverted U-shaped relationship with innovation drive.The innovation drive of ordinary employees is most effectively stimulated when the average salary of ordinary employees is 2.56 times the industry average.(3) Both the external pay dispersion of executives and ordinary employees have significant dynamic effects on innovation drive.The external pay dispersion of executives is significantly positively correlated with innovation drive, while the external pay dispersion of ordinary employees has an inverted U-shaped relationship with innovation drive.The maximum difference in innovation drive is achieved when the salary of ordinary employees is 2.56 times the industry average.(4) The impact of external pay dispersion on innovation drive is more prominent in private enterprises and highly competitive industries.#br#This study confirms that a closer pay dispersion is not always better.A moderate pay dispersion can help stimulate innovation activities, but pay dispersion cannot be expanded without limitation.Enterprises should alleviate the sense of unfairness and dissatisfaction among ordinary employees by improving the fairness of the ratio between labor input and salary income and enhancing the incentive effect of the salary gap on innovation.Compared with existing literature, the marginal contribution of this paper is that it further reveals the internal mechanism of the impact of internal and external pay dispersion on innovation drive based on social comparison theory and cognitive evaluation theory on the basis of existing tournament theory and behavioral theory and presents selective effects of pay dispersion on innovation impact.In summary,this study analyzes the impact of pay dispersion on innovation drive from both static and dynamic levels, providing a comprehensive and in-depth understanding of the relationship between pay dispersion and innovation drive.#br#
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