管理层能力与企业创新价值关系研究——对2007-2019年A股上市公司的实证分析

田玲; 杨威

doi:10.6049/kjjbydc.2020100301

科技进步与对策 >

2021 , Vol. 38 >Issue 5: 59 - 68

DOI: https://doi.org/10.6049/kjjbydc.2020100301

企业创新管理

管理层能力与企业创新价值关系研究——对2007-2019年A股上市公司的实证分析

田玲 ,
杨威

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（武汉大学经济与管理学院，湖北武汉430000）

田玲（1969—），女，山东文登人，博士，武汉大学经济与管理学院教授、博士生导师，研究方向为保险经济学与风险管理；杨威（1984—），男，广东深圳人，武汉大学经济与管理学院博士研究生，研究方向为风险管理。

收稿日期: 2020-12-10

修回日期: 2021-01-10

网络出版日期: 2021-03-22

基金资助

国家自然科学基金面上项目(71673206)

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Research on the Relationship between the Improvement of Management Capability and the Value of Enterprise Innovation：Empirical Analysis based on 2007-2019 A-share listed Companies

Tian Ling ,
Yang Wei

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(School of Economics and Management, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430000, China)

Received date: 2020-12-10

Revised date: 2021-01-10

Online published: 2021-03-22

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摘要

创新不能仅局限于数量积累，更应注重价值提升。为深层次探讨企业创新与管理层能力间的关系，以2007-2019年A股上市公司为研究样本，采用数据包络分析法衡量管理层能力，并构建其与企业创新数量及创新价值间的关系模型，重点考察管理层能力对企业创新价值的影响。结果发现：①总体而言，管理层能力提升虽然会使专利数量减少，但却能够促使专利价值增值，即提升企业创新价值；②将管理层分为低能力组和高能力组发现，在低能力组，能力提升会增加非发明专利数量；在高能力组，能力提升将减少各类专利数量。这说明，低能力管理层注重“面子工程”，而高能力管理层更注重真才实干；③管理层能力对企业创新价值的促进作用在CEO任期长和国有产权企业中体现得较为明显。研究结论对企业创新价值提升具有一定启示作用。

关键词： 管理层能力; 创新价值; 专利数量; CEO任期; 产权性质

本文引用格式

田玲 , 杨威 . 管理层能力与企业创新价值关系研究——对2007-2019年A股上市公司的实证分析[J]. 科技进步与对策, 2021 , 38(5) : 59 -68 . DOI: 10.6049/kjjbydc.2020100301

Abstract

Innovation cannot be limited to quantity accumulation, but should focus on value enhancement. To have a further understanding of the relation between firm innovation and management ability, this paper construct the relational model, in which management ability is measured through DEA, based on the data of A-share listed companies in 2007-2019, mainly investigating whether management ability improve firms' innovation value, It turns out that, overall, higher management ability reduces the number of patents, but increases the market value to innovation output, indicating that management ability can enhance the innovation value. We then divide the managers into high-ability group and low-ability group and find that, in the low- ability group, the increase in ability only increases the number of non-invention patents, while in high-ability group, the improvement of ability decrease the number of patents. This shows that low-ability managers pay more attention to "face projects" while high-ability managers pay attention to "really hard work". Finally, the promotion effect of management ability on patent value exists mainly in firms with long tenure CEOs, state-owned property rights and larger analyst following. Our paper provides evidence for enhancing the value of innovation from the perspective of management ability.

Key words： Management Ability; Innovation Value; Number of Patents; CEO Long Tenure; Property Right

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