部分企业为应对政策考核或塑造积极的绿色形象，片面追求绿色专利产出而忽视其质量，引发策略性创新行为，导致绿色专利泡沫问题。以我国沪深A股上市公司为研究样本，基于投资者互动平台的问答数据，从互动数量与互动质量两个维度刻画双向信息互动行为，系统考察其对企业绿色专利泡沫的影响。研究发现，投资者与企业之间的双向信息互动显著抑制企业绿色专利泡沫，且互动质量的抑制作用强于互动数量。机制分析表明，双向信息互动通过信息效应和治理效应双路径发挥作用：一方面，有效缓解企业与投资者之间的信息不对称，另一方面，显著提升企业内部治理水平，从而有效遏制企业绿色专利泡沫。异质性分析显示，在机构投资者持股比例较大、媒体关注度较高以及环保背景高管占比较高的企业中，双向信息互动的抑制效果更显著，表明机构投资者、媒体及环保导向型管理层与互动平台形成的协同机制能进一步抑制企业绿色专利泡沫。此外，经济后果分析表明，双向信息互动通过抑制绿色专利泡沫，能够持续提升企业绿色创新能力。研究从信息互动视角揭示了投资者互动平台在公司治理中的关键作用，并为企业从策略性创新转向实质性绿色创新提供了现实指引。

Against the backdrop of China's "dual carbon" strategy, the rapid proliferation of green patents has become an important symbol of firms' environmental responsibility efforts. However, owing to regulatory pressures or the desire to project a positive environmental image, a growing number of firms tend to pursue the quantity rather than the quality of green patents. This has led to the emergence of "green patent bubbles", characterized by excessive patent filings with limited technological substance and environmental value. Such behavior not only distorts the market's assessment of firms' true innovation capability but also undermines public trust. Therefore, identifying green patent bubbles and effectively restraining firms' strategic innovation behavior are crucial for promoting their long-term sustainable development.
In this context, the establishment of the Investor Interaction Platform (IIP) by the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges provides a new institutional channel for information exchange and corporate governance. Unlike traditional one-way disclosure mechanisms, the platform facilitates direct, transparent, and real-time communication between investors and listed firms. Through online question-and-answer interactions, investors can express concerns, request clarifications, and obtain informal yet highly valuable information. Firms, in turn, are required to respond promptly and appropriately, with the quality and timeliness of their responses included in disclosure evaluations. However, existing literature mostly focuses on one-way indicators, such as the number of questions asked on the platform, which not only ignores the two-way nature of information exchange and the quality of interaction but also fails to reveal the intrinsic connection between two-way information interaction mechanisms and corporate green patent bubbles. To address this gap, this study draws on data from Chinese A-share listed companies between 2010 and 2023, and employs two-way interaction data from the Investor Interaction Platform to measure information exchange behaviors in terms of interaction quantity and interaction quality, and systematically examines how such two-way information interaction between investors and firms affects corporate green patent bubbles.
The findings show that two-way information exchange significantly curbs corporate green patent bubbles, with interaction quality exhibiting a more pronounced inhibitory effect compared to interaction quantity. The mechanism analysis indicates that two-way information exchange operates through two pathways: on the one hand, it effectively alleviates information asymmetry between firms and investors; on the other hand, it significantly enhances the internal governance level of firms. Both of these pathways effectively curb the formation of green patent bubbles. Heterogeneity analysis shows that the inhibitory effect of two-way information exchange on green patent bubbles is more pronounced in firms with a higher proportion of institutional investor ownership, higher media attention, and executives with stronger environmental backgrounds. Moreover, the analysis of economic consequences suggests that two-way information exchange can lead to a sustained improvement in firms' substantive green innovation capabilities by suppressing green patent bubbles.
This study makes three key theoretical contributions. First, it broadens corporate green innovation research by focusing on green innovation bubbles. By quantifying bubble severity and integrating the institutional context of official investor interaction platforms, it systematically analyzes how two-way information exchange governs such bubbles. This addresses the "quantity-over-quality" issue in corporate green innovation practices, offering new theoretical and empirical insights into the formation and governance of quality-deviant green innovation. Second, it enriches literature on interaction platforms' economic impacts by centering on two-way information interaction. Through a dual-dimensional index system (interaction quantity and quality), it comprehensively characterizes investor-firm information exchange, exploring its mechanisms via "information effect" and "governance effect" pathways. This reveals platforms' critical role in driving firms from formalistic to substantive green innovation. Finally, it provides policy and governance guidance for multi-stakeholder groups to use interaction platforms in promoting firms' shift from strategic to substantive green innovation. The findings support governments in optimizing information disclosure and platform regulation, guide firms in enhancing response quality and standardizing green innovation, and help investors identify bubbles and avoid greenwashing risks.