科技管理创新

产业政策与竞争政策的技术创新效应:协调促进还是冲突抑制

  • 刘冰冰 ,
  • 刘爱梅
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  • (1.中国社会科学院大学 应用经济学院,北京 102488;2.山东社会科学院 农村发展研究所,山东 济南 250002)
刘冰冰(1997—),女,山东潍坊人,中国社会科学院大学应用经济学院博士研究生,研究方向为产业组织与竞争政策;刘爱梅(1978—),女,山东潍坊人,博士,山东社会科学院农村发展研究所研究员,研究方向为区域经济。

收稿日期: 2024-02-15

  修回日期: 2024-04-30

  网络出版日期: 2025-04-25

基金资助

山东省重点研发计划(软科学)(2023RKY06012);济南“海右计划”哲学社会科学领域中青年学术骨干人才项目(202312)

The Technological Innovation Effects of Industrial Policy and Competition Policy: Coordinated Promotion or Contradictory Suppression

  • Liu Bingbing ,
  • Liu Aimei
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  • (1.School of Applied Economics, University of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing 102488, China;2.Agricultural Development Institute of Shandong Academy of Social Sciences, Jinan 250002, China)

Received date: 2024-02-15

  Revised date: 2024-04-30

  Online published: 2025-04-25

摘要

使用沪深A股制造业上市公司数据,将产业政策和竞争政策纳入同一分析框架,分析两类政策工具搭配对企业创新的影响。研究发现:以政府补贴为代表的产业政策和以公平竞争审查制度为代表的竞争政策均能够显著提升企业技术创新水平,但税收优惠政策和功能性产业政策的创新效应不明显;考虑政策叠加效应后发现,补贴政策和竞争政策共同实施会对企业创新产生冲突抑制作用,而税收优惠政策、功能性产业政策与竞争政策叠加的冲突效应不显著;在不同行业竞争水平条件下,政策叠加效应呈现出显著差异。进一步利用空间杜宾模型得出,政府补贴政策和功能性产业政策对周边城市创新存在正向溢出效应,而竞争政策会产生负向溢出效应。提出推动选择性产业政策向功能性产业政策转型,协调产业政策与竞争政策间关系,协同推动企业创新。

本文引用格式

刘冰冰 , 刘爱梅 . 产业政策与竞争政策的技术创新效应:协调促进还是冲突抑制[J]. 科技进步与对策, 2025 , 42(8) : 24 -33 . DOI: 10.6049/kjjbydc.2024020190

Abstract

Innovation is the first driving force behind high-quality economic development. The key technology bottlenecks and the low-added value of products have been restricting China′s high-quality development. Therefore, it is necessary to adopt appropriate industrial policies to support key technological innovation and the innovation and development of strategic emerging industries. At the same time, the government should improve the competition policy and continuously optimize the environment for industrial development. Industrial policy is an important tool for China′s economic transformation and development, and both the central and local governments have actively implemented different types of industrial policies to support or stimulate the development of specific industries, including financial subsidies, tax incentives, and other policies. Competition policy refers to the various economic policies implemented by the government to protect, promote, and regulate market competition. Existing studies have not fully explained whether the joint implementation of various policies has a synergistic effect on innovation or hinders innovation.
Although some scholars have analyzed the relationship between industrial policy and competition policy, few have demonstrated it from a micro-empirical perspective. To improve policy synergy, optimize policy tools, and ensure the smooth development of innovation, this study explores the impact of industrial policy and competition policy on enterprise technology. It investigates whether the selective industrial policy represented by government subsidies and tax incentives and the functional industrial policy represented by the provision of public services and competition policy can produce policy synergy and achieve the purpose of stimulating enterprise innovation. First, the study finds that, except for functional industrial policies, other policies can effectively improve the level of technological innovation in enterprises. After placing industrial policy and competition policy in a unified analytical framework, it is found that the selective industrial policy represented by the subsidy policy and the competition policy produces significant contradictions and conflicts, which inhibit enterprise innovation, while the conflict between preferential tax policies and functional industrial policies and competition policies is not significant. This suggests that it is necessary to avoid direct subsidy-type industrial policies. From the heterogeneity analysis, we concluded that the level of industry competition can affect the synergistic effect of industrial policy and competition policy. The competition policy and functional industrial policy are more constrained in industries with low competition levels. Further analysis shows that the spatial Durbin model at the city level shows that selective industrial policy and functional industrial policy can have policy spillover effects on neighboring cities and promote innovation in neighboring cities, while competition policy has a policy siphoning effect on neighboring cities and inhibits innovation in neighboring cities.
The possible marginal contributions of this paper are threefold. Firstly, from a micro-empirical perspective, the positive role of industrial policy and competition policy on enterprise innovation is verified, and industrial policy and competition policy are incorporated into the unified analytical framework to study the superimposed innovation effects of different industrial policy tools and competition policy. It is concluded that the policy combination of the two has a conflict inhibition effect on innovation. Secondly, the study uses the spatial Durbin model to verify the spatial spillover effect of industrial policy and competition policy, which has certain policy reference significance for the overall planning of regional innovation and development. Thirdly, by evaluating the innovation effects of industrial policy and competition policy, this study concludes that China′s selective industrial policy still has a strong position, and the competition policy is in a weak position, and there is an obvious conflict and inhibition relationship between industrial policy and competition policy for industries with different levels of competition. Therefore, it is necessary to optimize the combination of policy tools for industries with different levels of competition, steadily promote the transformation of selective industrial policies to functional industrial policies, and establish the fundamental role of competition policies.

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