Endogenous growth theory holds that technology innovation is the driving force for economic growth, and green technology innovation can help enterprises obtain environmental and economic benefits. However, due to the high investment in technology innovation, the long cycle, uncertain income and positive environmental externalities, enterprises are usually unwilling to carry out green technology innovation activities. Therefore, it is necessary for the government to provide support and supervision in practice to improve the innovation enthusiasm of enterprises, such as through environmental protection subsidies and tax incentives. Government environmental supervision is important to regulate enterprises' environmental behavior, enhance environmental awareness, and promote green technology innovation.
At present, many researchers have discussed the impact of environmental supervision, executive characteristics and external media attention on green technology innovation. Foreign studies on government supervision mainly focus on enterprise information disclosure, investment decision-making and government subsidies, while domestic studies mainly focus on enterprises'environmental information disclosure, environmental performance and environmental investment. In general, there are few studies on government environmental supervision at home and abroad. And few studies have explored the relationship between government environmental supervision and enterprise green technology innovation. Therefore, this paper focuses on the impact of government environmental supervision on enterprise green technology innovation, and analyzes the impact mechanism from the perspective of internal control and the mechanism of marketization level.
According to theoretical analysis and references to previous literature, this paper puts forward five research hypotheses. It uses the unbalanced panel data of industrial enterprises listed on A-shares in 120 cities in China from 2012 to 2019, and sets the PITI index as the proxy variable for government environmental supervision, and the number of green patent applications as a proxy variable for green technology innovation. From the perspective of internal control, this paper systematically examines the impact and mechanism of government environmental supervision on enterprise green technology innovation, and also analyzes the moderating role of marketization level in the process of government environmental supervision affecting enterprise green technology innovation. It is found that, first, government environmental supervision has a significant positive impact on enterprise green technology innovation. This conclusion is still valid after many robustness tests. Second, internal control plays a mediating role in the process of government environmental supervision affecting enterprise green technology innovation. Third, the level of marketization can negatively moderate the relationship between government environmental supervision and enterprise green technology innovation.
The contributions of this paper are mainly reflected in three aspects. First, from the perspective of internal control, this paper studies the relationship between government environmental supervision and enterprise green technology innovation, broadening the research perspective of existing literature on green technology innovation. Second, at the micro-level, government environmental supervision is linked with green technology innovation, which enriches the research on the environmental governance effect of government supervision. Third, internal control and marketization level are introduced as mediating variables and moderating variables, respectively, to further explore the factors and mechanism of government supervision affecting green technology innovation, which provide theoretical reference and a practical basis for improving the environmental supervision mechanism.
The following policy recommendations are proposed. Firstly, the government should strengthen the construction of the institutional environment and moderately improve environmental supervision. It is vital to strengthen government environmental supervision so as to improve the level of green technology innovation of enterprises. The government should gradually improve the environmental supervision system, and continuously improve the efficiency and effectiveness of environmental supervision by building accountability systems and completing policy tools. Secondly, it is shown that the innovation resources and innovation motivation of enterprises in regions with low marketization levels are insufficient. Therefore, the government should constantly improve and standardize the market environment, so that enterprises can obtain innovation resources easily, enhance innovation motivation, and ultimately improve the level of green technology innovation. Thirdly, enterprises are advised to strengthen internal control and improve the internal control system. Government environmental supervision will encourage enterprises to improve their internal control, which will then increase their green technology innovation. Therefore, as a process that is conducive to improving production efficiency and economic benefits, and reducing the risk of R&D activities, internal control should be given more attention.
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