科技法制与政策

再融资政策与科技型中小企业创新产出——来自创业板上市公司的实证研究

  • 王帅 ,
  • 陈玥卓 ,
  • 李晨光
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  • (北京大学 经济学院,北京 100871)
王帅(1995—),男,山东聊城人,北京大学经济学院博士研究生,研究方向为企业创新管理、能源经济;陈玥卓(1995—),女,陕西西安人,北京大学经济学院博士研究生,研究方向为产业政策、创新政策;李晨光(1995—),男,吉林人,北京大学经济学院博士研究生,研究方向为企业创新管理。本文通讯作者:李晨光。

收稿日期: 2021-11-12

  修回日期: 2022-02-13

  网络出版日期: 2023-07-25

基金资助

国家自然科学基金项目(72073007)

Refinancing Policy and Innovation Output of Technological SMEs: An Empirical Study Based on Listed Companies on the Growth Enterprise Market

  • Wang Shuai ,
  • Chen Yuezhuo ,
  • Li Chenguang
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  • (School of Economics, Peking University, Beijing 100871,China)

Received date: 2021-11-12

  Revised date: 2022-02-13

  Online published: 2023-07-25

摘要

2014年中国证监会出台针对创业板上市公司再融资政策,旨在为科技型中小企业研发创新活动提供金融支持。基于2009—2019年沪深A股上市公司样本,采用PSM—DID方法实证分析创业板再融资政策对企业创新产出的影响及作用机制。结果表明:再融资政策能够显著增加企业专利申请量和授权量,促进创新产出。机制分析发现,再融资政策可以通过缓解企业融资约束、提升现金流水平、增加研发投入和提高营运能力等方式促进企业创新产出。按照内部企业特征和外部市场环境对样本进行划分,回归分析结果发现,代理成本低、金融化程度低、非国有创业板上市公司将所募集资金用于研发创新活动的动机更强,面临较强外部市场监督、激烈的市场竞争或位于东部省市的创业板上市公司,其创新产出受再融资政策的正向影响更显著。因此,应进一步优化再融资制度,持续降低创业板上市公司再融资门槛,加强股权再融资事后监管与市场监督,加快完善创新驱动发展战略的金融支持体系。

本文引用格式

王帅 , 陈玥卓 , 李晨光 . 再融资政策与科技型中小企业创新产出——来自创业板上市公司的实证研究[J]. 科技进步与对策, 2023 , 40(14) : 94 -102 . DOI: 10.6049/kjjbydc.2021110371

Abstract

Innovation is the most crucial driving force for development and the strategic support for developing a modernized economy. Since the reform and opening up, it has been proven that small and medium-sized enterprises are the main body of innovation and the main force in promoting technological innovation. It is a key point to promote the transformation of old economic growth driver and achieve high-quality economic development by fully stimulating the development vitality of small and medium-sized enterprises and arousing their enthusiasm for innovation, and it's also of great significance to implement the innovation-driven development strategy. In 2009, the opening of GEM broadened financing channels for technology-oriented SMEs and provided strong financial support for their innovation. Subsequently, the GEM refinancing system has been absent for a period of time. In order to meet the urgent practical needs for refinancing SMEs, in 2014, China Securities Regulatory Commission launched the GEM refinancing policy to further broaden the financing channels for listed companies on GEM. Therefore it is necessary to study the impact of the refinancing policy and verify whether the policy can stimulate the R&D and innovation activities of SMEs and improve their innovation performance.#br#By reviewing the existing literature, it is found that firstly the existing literature pays little attention to the impact of refinancing policies for technology-based SMEs on enterprise innovation. Secondly, there are few literatures focusing on the relationship between listed company refinancing and its innovation output. Finally, the existing literature mainly analyzes the impact of different financing methods on innovation from the perspective of the suitability between different financing methods and enterprise innovation activities, and studies a certain influencing factor of enterprise innovation activities alone.#br#The GEM refinancing policy in 2014 had a policy impact only on GEM listed companies, providing a quasi-natural experiment for researchers to explore the impact of the refinancing policy on innovation behavior of technology-based SMEs. From the perspective of enterprise innovation performance, this paper applies PSM-DID method to empirically analyze the net effect of GEM refinancing policy on enterprise innovation output. It also systematically analyzes the internal mechanism by which the refinancing policy influence enterprise innovation output.#br#The main conclusions of this paper are as follows. (1) The GEM refinancing policy can effectively stimulate the R&D and innovation activities of GEM listed companies and increase the innovation output. This conclusion is still valid after a series of robustness tests. (2) There may be three paths for the promotion of refinancing policy on the innovation output of GEM listed companies. First of all, GEM listed companies face more serious financing constraints than those listed on the main board. Refinancing policy broadens financing channels for their innovation activities, reduces the cost of external financing, effectively alleviates its financing constraints, and thus promotes the increase of innovation output. Secondly, the refinancing policy makes the financing channels of GEM listed companies more diversified, and reduces the difficulty of financing. It is equivalent to providing a positive cash flow shock for the GEM listed companies. The improvement of cash flow level prompts enterprises to increase R&D investment, which ultimately increases their innovation output. Finally, the operational capability plays an important role in the management and operation of the enterprise. The refinancing policy improves the operational capability of the enterprise, and in turn it promotes the increase of their innovation output. (3) In terms of heterogeneity, both internal firm characteristics and external market environment have significant impacts on the net effect of refinancing policy. Specifically, GEM-listed companies with lower agency costs, lower degree of financialization, and non-state-owned companies have greater incentives to use the funds raised for R&D and innovation activities. Besides, the companies with stronger external market supervision and competition and the companies located in eastern provinces are more sensitive to the impact of refinancing policies on their innovation output.#br#In summary, this paper empirically analyzes the effect of GEM refinancing policy and reveals the internal mechanism of refinancing policy affecting enterprise innovation output. The research provides important practical value and policy significance for optimizing the refinancing policy, promoting R&D and innovation and implementing national innovation-driven development strategies.#br#

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