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| Institutional Causes, Legal Response and International Governance of Technology Regulation under "Long Arm Jurisdiction" |
| Rao Xiancheng,Xu Difeng |
| (Law School,Nanjing University, Nanjing 210093, China) |
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Abstract The United States uses the "entity list" system and other measures to eliminate China from the high-end industrial chain based on its technological hegemony, in order to weaken technological competitiveness of China. Coupled with the impact of high tariffs, it forces some of Chinese industries to move overseas to a certain extent, touching the bottom line of China's security and even the global supply chain. The trade and flow of technology and products are based on commercial behavior. It has constituted a "long arm jurisdiction" beyond the scope of national sovereignty by unilaterally restricting the flow of technology for political purposes. The technology regulation under the "long arm jurisdiction" of the United States does cause the problem of technology bottlenecks to China. This paper attempts to analyze the causes of the above problems from the institutional level. From the perspective of external factors, the western countries led by the United States use technological sovereignty to exercise technological hegemony and use technological control measures to exercise "long arm jurisdiction". In terms of internal factors, the Chinese enterprises are short of subjective estimation and there are objectively insufficient incentives for fundamental research by the property right mechanism in China. Technological hegemony can go beyond the "wall" built by multilateralism to curb the scientific and technological development and technological flow of specific countries, and China has become its primary "sniper" target. Chinese enterprises embrace globalization, but to a certain extent, they ignore the harm of "anti-globalization" and the devastating impact of technological constraints on the survival of enterprises.#br# This paper proposes that China should first counter it through domestic legislation, and China has actually adopted the list system of unreliable entities and blocking methods. On this basis, China has formulated the anti-foreign sanctions law and the export control law. The anti-foreign sanctions law not only constructs the extraterritorial legislative jurisdiction in the field of public law, but also endows the private subject with the right to sue for civil compensation. It is necessary for China to coordinate and amend the foreign trade law and the export control law, and incorporate the non-traditional security concept into them to form a unified national security exception clause.#br# It has made principled provisions on the localization transplantation of the American "Bayh-Dole Act" in China in the Law of the People's Republic of China on Scientific and Technological Progress, but the reality has led to the dilemma of its localization application. There is an urgent need to communicate between academia and industry about the improvement of the incentive mechanism of basic research needs.#br# The innovation of this paper is that the introduction of civil public interest litigation can overcome the problem of "tragedy of the commons" in the application of the anti-foreign sanctions law, so Chinese enterprises can avoid from offending enterprises in the industrial chain that comply with the U.S. sanctions plan. Adjusting the novelty grace period system in China's patent law can open up the path of property right of technical documents, provide effective incentives for industry, and will not directly interfere with the scientific autonomy of academia. It not only ensures the scientific autonomy of the academic community and reduces the conflict between knowledge privatization and innovation culture, but also provides rich sources of technology that can be property rights for the industrial community. The industrial community and the academic community virtually form a rational joint force to solve problems in a certain field of science and Engineering Technology.#br#From the research of this paper, we can draw the following conclusions. There are contradictions in the US technology restriction measures. Adhering to the concept of community of human destiny, China should adopt an active and open national innovation system, deeply integrate the industrial chain with the world, actively reshape the global science and technology and trade systems and finally win the "science and technology war".#br#
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Received: 29 November 2021
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