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| Industrial Policy, Innovation and Manufacturing Firms Servitization |
| Feng Yujing1,Zhai Liangliang2 |
| (1. Institute of Finance and Public Management,Anhui University of Finance and Economics, Bengbu 233030, China; 2. School of International Trade and Economics, Shandong University of Finance and Economics,Jinan 250014, China) |
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Abstract The effect of industrial policy on firms and its intrinsic mechanism has become a hot research topic. The state mainly intervenes the economy through industrial policy which can promote the upgrading of industrial structure by guiding industrial development. At present, there are two viewpoints arguing about the validity of the effect of industrial policy. Servitization is a general trend and inevitable choice of high-quality development for manufacturing industry. Compared with western developed countries, manufacturing industry servitization in China is obviously lower. There are few studies focus on the impact of industrial policy on manufacturing firms servitization. Therefore, this paper can enrich the literature foundation of microeconomic effects of industrial policy and is also a useful supplement to the existing research on influencing factors of manufacturing industry servitization.#br#Innovation is the basis and premise for firms to provide professional and comprehensive services, so innovation is the key to manufacturing firms servitization. It is one of the strategic goals of Made in China 2025, a program launched by Chinese government to consolidate the country as a global high technology manufacturing economy, and it requires manufacturing industry to transform from factor-driven mode to innovation-driven mode. Therefore, this paper mainly discusses from the perspective of firm R&D innovation. The positive impact of industrial policy is discussed as follows. Firstly, it brings cost effect to firms. Industrial policy can reduce cost that is an important constraint on innovation. Secondly, it brings resource effect. Government subsidy in industrial policy can directly supply firms with capital which can reduce innovation risks. Thirdly, it enhances firms' competitive advantage. Competition for resources between new and old firms will intensify industry competition, which encourages firms to take the initiative to increase R&D and innovation investment. Finally, it brings a signaling effect to the market. Social capital tends to flow into the supported industries with greater potential and better prospects, so as to pursue long-term and stable income to alleviate financing constraints. Meanwhile, industrial policy may have negative effects. Firstly, it may crowd out firms' independent R&D investment, which is harmful to cultivate firms' innovation capacity. Secondly, it may lead to a rent-seeking effect, which can reduce innovation efficiency. #br#Based on the database of listed firms from 2000 to 2019, the implementation of Made in China 2025 is used as a quasi-natural experiment, and the grouping dummy variable and the staging dummy variable are set in this paper. Firms belonging to the key industries supported by Made in China 2025 are divided into experimental group; otherwise, they are divided into control group. There are ten key industries with clear boundaries, and the buffer period from introduction to implementation is very short. For this reason, Made in China 2025 can be considered as an exogenous policy impact on firms, providing a good prerequisite for the application of DID model. #br#There is no individual expected effect of firms in the implementation of Made in China 2025, and the DID model in this paper passes the parallel trend hypothesis test. There are two approaches to the placebo test, one is to advance the year of the exogenous event and re-perform the baseline regression using data from the year prior to the event; the other is to repeat random sampling, in which simulated regression is performed by randomly assigning the experimental and control groups. The results show that the basic conclusion in this paper is not accidental, which further verifies the correctness of the DID model. The result of dynamic effect test shows that Made in China 2025 significantly promotes manufacturing firms servitization in the year and the four years after it was implemented.#br#By combining with theoretical analysis and empirical test, the following conclusions are obtained. Firstly on the whole, Made in China 2025 can improve manufacturing firms servitization rate. Made in China 2025 affects manufacturing firms servitization through influencing innovation, and brings both positive and negative effects. Made in China 2025 promotes manufacturing firms servitization by improving productivity and increasing investment, while it hinders manufacturing firms servitization by reducing the return on investment. Secondly there is heterogeneity of ownership in the effects of Made in China 2025 on manufacturing firms servitization. Private firms are promoted, while state-owned firms and foreign founded firms are not. Lastly there is also regional heterogeneity in the effects of Made in China 2025 on manufacturing firms servitization. The firms in eastern and central regions are significantly promoted, while the firms in western region are not.#br#
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Received: 08 June 2021
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