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| Does the Heterogeneity of Institutional Investors Translate into the Dual Innovation Investment of Enterprises? From the Perspective of Attention-based View and Market Catering Theory |
| Shao Jianbing,Li Na |
| （Business School，Liaoning University，Shenyang 110036，China） |
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Abstract The fifth Plenary Session of the 19th CPC Central Committee emphasizes the central role of innovation in China's modernization, identifies self-reliance and self-improvement in science and technology as strategic support for China's development, and outlines the blueprint of the 14th Five-Year Plan and 2035 vision. At present, China's innovation development is characterized by "emphasizing quantity over quality", the overall efficiency of innovation activities is not high, and most enterprises focus on single exploratory innovation or development innovation. In addition, western countries led by the United States block China's key technologies under the pretext of national security threats, and China's high-tech industry is facing threats and challenges to climb to the high end of the global value chain. Therefore, Chinese enterprises need to further promote independent innovation, balance their own "dual" capabilities, and get rid of excessive dependence on foreign advanced technology. Institutional investors have good advantages in information integration, professional knowledge and relevant experience, and their dual roles of "internal important shareholders" and "external supervisors" are becoming increasingly obvious. The role of institutional investors in enterprise innovation has attracted the attention of practical and academic fields. Based on shareholder activism and principal-agent theory, some researches focus on the impact of shareholder activism on homogeneous innovation investment, but lack of discussions on the relationship between institutional investors and dual innovation investment.#br#This paper takes Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share high-tech enterprises from 2011 to 2020 as the research samples. Firstly, according to The Administrative Measures for the Recognition of High-Tech Enterprises, industries with low scientific and technological level are eliminated. Secondly, this paper matches the eight industries involved in the identification management measures with the industry standards of the CSRC, and finally it selects ten industries including pharmaceutical manufacturing industry, general equipment manufacturing industry, automobile manufacturing industry, computer, communication and other electronic equipment manufacturing industry,etc. with a total of 8 598 samples to conduct empirical analysis on heterogeneous institutional investors and dual innovation investment. The variables of this paper include institutional investors' shareholding, dual innovation investment, stock mispricing, management performance pressure and external supervision pressure. Taking into account the enterprises' financial situation, ownership structure, government subsidies and other factors, this paper also sets up some control variables covering Capital structure, tangible assets and equity concentration and so on. The research conclusions are drawn as bellows. #br#Firstly, heterogeneous institutional investors have a differentiated impact on dual innovation investment, and focused institutional investors are more favorable to dual innovation investment than temporary institutional investors. Secondly, focused institutional investors influence the allocation of decision-makers' attention resources and they should pay more attention to exploratory innovation investment. However, temporary institutional investors act on developmental innovation investment based on market catering motivation, and the greater the management performance pressure and external regulatory pressure, the more obvious the catering motivation. Thirdly, in terms of the mechanism of action, focused institutional investors play an important role in dual-innovation investment of enterprises through supervision, incentive of management, and improvement of enterprise risk taking level. However, the effect of temporary institutional investors on development innovation investment through enhancing investor sentiment has not been verified. These results indicate that the participation of focused institutional investors in enterprise innovation decisions is the result of profit maximization after the game with management, and the difference of attention allocation has a differentiated effect on dual innovation investment. Temporary institutional investors' motivation to cater for development innovation is verified, but it is not obvious in the capital market. Fourthly, industrial policy can not only enhance the influence of focused institutional investors on policy makers' attention, but also make them focus more on exploratory innovation investment. Industrial policy also helps to enhance the development innovation of temporary institutional investors to meet the investment motivation. The conclusions also verify the micro-policy effects of the 12th Five-Year Plan and 13th Five-Year Plan, that is, the formulation and implementation of external industrial policies play an "accelerator" role in the participation of institutional investors in enterprise innovation decisions.#br#Compared with previous studies, this study has the following the marginal contribution. Firstly, this paper constructs a behavioral governance framework of heterogeneous institutional investors' role in dual-innovation investment. Existing scholars mostly carry out researches based on the effect of heterogeneous institutional investors on the overall innovation of enterprises. The dynamic changes of governance roles when heterogeneous institutional investors participate in dual innovation investment activities are ignored. This paper finds that institutional investors make discretionary decisions in the process of governance participation, and their motivation of differentiated behaviors is to maximize the interests after considering the organizational situation and the game with the management. Secondly, the attention base view and market catering theory are introduced to explain the differential behavior logic of heterogeneous institutional investors' participation in dual-innovation investment. In view of the different governance roles of heterogeneous institutional investors, there are different behavioral logics for dual innovation activities, which cannot be generalized. Finally, this article digs into the heterogeneity of institutional investors on the dual path the influence of innovation investment, and considers the heterogeneous industrial policy and the influence of the dual innovation investment institutions, with a view to more accurately understanding of China's actual situation referring to how institutional investors participate in enterprise innovation and governance behavior. This study provides a logical explanation for the different behaviors of institutional investors, and provides a reference for the innovation practice effect at the micro level of industrial policy enterprises, as well as for the government and enterprises.#br#
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Received: 03 September 2021
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