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| Is there two Sides to R&D Incentive Industrial Policy：Empirical Evidence from the Deduction Policy for R&D Expenses |
| Su Lizhong1,Zhang Runda1,Wang Jingyu2 |
| (1.Business School, Beijing Technology and Business University, Beijing 100048, China;2.School of Accountancy, Central University of Finance and Economics, Beijing 100081, China) |
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Abstract There are two different views on the effectiveness of R & D incentive industrial policies. One side believes that it is helpful to promote enterprise technological progress and improve enterprise innovation level, while the other side believes that in the case of asymmetric information, it is difficult for the government to determine the real needs of incentive enterprises, and enterprises may take strategic response to seek resources. As a result, the incentive effect of industrial policy is weakened. The above two views are the theoretical origin of "industrial policy debate".However, compared with the debate over whether industrial policy is effective, this paper focuses more on the issue of how the government can better implement industrial policy. As a representative R&D incentive industrial policy with both benefits and preferential intensity, the policy of additional deduction for R&D expenses has repeatedly appeared in the 2021 Government Work Report and other relevant policy documents. It is an important link in the integrated policy chain of financial subsidies, tax incentives, scientific and technological financial support and accelerated transformation of achievements constructed by the state to support enterprises' scientific and technological innovation, and is the focus of this paper. Existing studies have found that policy can help to stimulate enterprises' R&D behavior and enhance their independent innovation ability, but also that policy can encourage enterprises' strategic response motivation and increase their R&D manipulation behavior. Therefore, it is of great significance to implement the national innovation development strategy and promote high-quality economic development how to improve the R&D additional deduction policy, so as to suppress the negative effects of the policy and give better play to its positive effects.#br#This paper takes China's A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2019 as the research object. Firstly, it analyzes the implementation effect of the policy, and then examines the interaction between the policy effects. On this basis, it discusses the direction of policy improvement in the future. It is found that there are both positive and negative effects in the process of policy implementation, and the negative effects will replace the positive effects. However, improving the effectiveness of internal control can suppress the negative effects of policies and amplify the positive effects of policies. Further research shows that the reason for the negative effects of policies is that enterprises carry out R&D manipulation with the help of policies, which improves short-term financial performance and short-term market performance. The study conclusion shows that the policy has two sides. On the one hand, it will encourage enterprises to increase R&D resource allocation, cultivate competitive advantages and promote the long-term value of the enterprise. On the other hand, it will also encourage enterprises' R&D manipulation such as strategic R&D or inflated R&D investment, resulting in a waste of policy resources. And R&d manipulation will undermine the long-term value of the enterprise. Therefore, it is urgent for the government to take reasonable countermeasures, timely detect and correct the R&D manipulation of beneficiary enterprises, strengthen tax incentives and weaken tax distortions, foster advantages and avoid disadvantages, and realize the optimization of policy resource allocation.#br#The potential marginal contribution of this paper is as follows. First, we propose that the policy has both positive and negative effects, which makes up for the deficiency of existing studies that only evaluate the economic consequences of the policy from a single aspect, and opens the "black box" of economic effects behind industrial policies. It not only coordinates the views of both sides in the "industrial policy debate", but also systematically answers the questions about the effectiveness of industrial policies. Second, we select the long-term value of enterprises instead of R&D investment as the evaluation index of the positive effect of the policy, which reasonably excludes the influence of R&D manipulation and overcomes the limitations of previous studies that take R&D investment as the evaluation index of policy effects. Third, previous studies focused on distinguishing the economic consequences of real high-tech enterprises and fake high-tech enterprises against high-tech enterprise certification policy, while we pay more attention on how to restrain the conditions and motivations of R&D manipulation by strengthening internal control of enterprises. Fourth, in consideration of the fact that the existing internal control index evaluation system has been relatively mature, we propose to add enterprises' internal control index as an evaluation factor in the future policy improvement and tax supervision, systematically answering the practical problem of how to better implement industrial policy, which is a beneficial exploration for China's current fiscal and tax reform.#br#At the same time, this paper also has some limitations. First of all, the statistical method adopted in this paper is not accurate enough to determine whether a specific enterprise enjoys the policy of additional deduction for R&D expenses, which may lead to measurement errors to a certain extent. Secondly, although theoretically we believe that taking the long-term value of enterprises as R&D investment can eliminate the interference of R&D manipulation to a certain extent, considering that there are many factors influencing the long-term value of enterprises. Therefore, there may be some noise when we take it as an evaluation indicator of the positive effect of policies, and the causality chain is longer. More reasonable and effective evaluation methods need to be developed in the future study. In addition, due to space constraints, we fail to show the moderating effects of different property rights, marketization degree, political connection and other factors on the research question, but focus on the innovative governance function of internal control. Finally, the latest policy of additional deduction for R&D expenses was jointly promulgated by the Ministry of Finance and the State Administration of Taxation in April 2021 and implemented in January. The new policy especially increases the proportion of additional deduction for manufacturing enterprises, which is undoubtedly a significant positive news for R&D activities of manufacturing enterprises, and further research can be carried out based on this policy in the future.#br#
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Received: 25 May 2021
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