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Local Government Performance Appeal, Government R&D Subsidies and Enterprise Innovation Efficiency |
Lin Aimei,Dou Hailin |
(School of Economics and Management,China University of Mining and Technology,Xuzhou 221000,China) |
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Abstract In recent years, the tide of "anti-globalization" is becoming increasingly fierce. How to promote the high-quality development of national economy through innovation of science and technology and system is the key to grasp the initiative of the future international market.Based on the theory of political promotion championship, this paper studies the deep institutional reasons for the influence of local governments' demands for political achievements on the innovation efficiency of enterprises, constructs a moderated mediator model, and discusses the mediating effect of government R&D subsidies between them and the moderating effect of innovation atmosphere.Through the empirical analysis of the sample of A-share listed companies from 2013 to 2018, the research finds that: ①The local government's demand for political achievements has A significant restraining effect on the innovation efficiency of enterprises;②Government r & D subsidies play a part of the intermediary role between local government performance demands and enterprise innovation efficiency;③The innovation atmosphere in the local government demands affect the enterprise innovation efficiency of the intermediary path in the second half plays a negative regulating role, that is, in the case of a low innovation atmosphere, the government research and development subsidies have a greater impact on the innovation efficiency of enterprises.Conclusion: The appeal of local government performance not only directly affects the innovation efficiency of enterprises, but also indirectly affects the innovation efficiency of enterprises through R&D subsidies.The innovation atmosphere moderates the influence of local government's achievement demands on the innovation efficiency of enterprises.
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Received: 18 July 2020
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