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| "Strong Supervision" or "Free Riding": How do Individual Blockholders Affect the Quality of Enterprise Patents |
| Fan Hanwen1,Zeng Fanhua2,3 |
| （1.School of Economics,Shanxi University of Finance and Economics,Taiyuan 030006,China;2.School of Economics,Zhongnan University of Economics and Law,Wuhan 430083,China3.City College,Wuhan University of Science and Technology,Wuhan 430083,China） |
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Abstract Constructing an improved knowledge width method to measure the patent quality of enterprises,this paper takes the data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2007 to 2016 as a sample to study the impact of individual blockholders on the patent quality of enterprises and the differences of their roles in different types of enterprises.The results show that as "strong supervisors",individual blockholders can improve the quality of enterprise patents.However,with the role changing from "strong supervision" to "free riding",this promotion does not exist in state-owned enterprises and enterprises with political connections.In addition,the role of individual blockholders in improving the patent quality of enterprises is realized by strengthening the supervision of managers and R&D personnel.
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Received: 08 June 2020
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