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| Dynamic Allocation Mechanism and Model Construction of Technology-based Entrepreneurial Firm |
| Hui Xiang,Li Bingxiang,Wu Zuguang,Li Mingmin |
| （School of Economics and Management, Xi'an University of Technology, Xi'an 710054, China） |
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Abstract Based on the capital-specific risk-taking commitment of the original funder's continuous holding model, it is difficult to realize the psychological vision of the technology entrepreneurial team “holding original technology to create their own business”, which is easy to trigger the lack of initiative and stability in the process of enterprise growth. This leads to the failure of the technical team to start a business and the loss of the original investor. In view of the above problems, this paper takes into account the value-added of the original investor capital and the entrepreneurial vision of the technical team. According to the equity allocation qualification, equity adjustment and direction respectively depends on the specific investment, the degree of proprietary contribution and the speed of proprietary rendering. So the enterprise income is decomposed into the preferential capital gains reflecting the capital-specific inputs and the remaining distributable income representing the exclusive contribution of the venture capital. Based on the financing contract theory and the securities design theory, the income distribution is embedded into the enterprise internal financing mode, and then constructs the technology entrepreneurial enterprise equity dynamic allocation model. The conclusions of the study help to enhance the effectiveness of equity management in technology entrepreneurial enterprises, and provide theoretical guidance for improving the stability and enthusiasm of entrepreneurial teams.
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Received: 14 November 2019
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