|
|
|
| Permeability of Non-state Capital,Equity Incentive for Senior Executives and R&D Costs |
| Ji Yiting1,2,Cheng Kunyu1 |
| （1.School of Management, Yunnan University of Finance and Economics;2.China Vocational College，Yunnan University of Finance and Economics,Kunming 650221，China） |
|
|
|
|
Abstract This paper selects the mixed-ownership enterprises of Shanghai Stock Exchange from 2013 to 2017 as the research object. From the perspective of the classified governance of mixed ownership enterprises,this paper analyzes the influence of non-state capital penetration and equity incentive for senior executives on R&D costs in Competitiveand Public welfare state-owned enterprises. It’s found that：（1）The infiltration degree of non-state capital in competitive state-owned enterprises?is significantly positively correlated with R&D costs.The infiltration degree of non-state capital in Public welfare state-owned enterprises has no significant effect on R&D costs.（2）For competitive state-owned enterprises, the equity incentive for senior executives weakens the promotion effect of non-state-owned capital infiltration on R&D costs.For public welfare state-owned enterprises，the equity incentive for senior executives is not significant for the promotion effect of non-state capital on R&D costs.
|
|
Received: 24 September 2019
|
|
|
|
|
|
| [1]李春涛,宋敏.中国制造业企业的创新活动：所有制和CEO激励的作用[J].经济研究，2010(5)：55-67.[2]吕新军.代理冲突与企业技术创新关系的实证分析[J].科研管理,2014(11)：6-67.[3]李文贵,余明桂.民营化企业的股权结构与企业创新[J].管理世界,2015(4)：112-125.[4]王业雯,陈林.混合所有制改革是否促进企业创新[J].经济与管理研究，2017(11)：112-121.[5]钟昀珈,张晨宇,陈德球.国企民营化与企业创新效率：促进还是抑制[J]. 财经研究,2016(7)：4-15.[6]王燕妮.高管激励对研发投入的影响研究——基于我国制造业上市公司的实证检验[J].科学学研究，2011(7):1071-1078.[7]张玉娟,汤湘希.股权结构、高管激励与企业创新——基于不同产权性质A股上市公司的数据[J].山西财经大学学报，2018(9)：76-93.[8]王姝勋,方红艳,荣昭.期权激励会促进公司创新吗——基于中国上市公司专利产出的证据[J].金融研究,2017(3):176-191.[9]田轩,孟清扬.股权激励计划能促进企业创新吗[J].南开管理评论，2018，21(3)： 176-190.[10]朱冰，张晓亮，郑晓佳.多个大股东与企业创新[J].管理世界，2018(7)：151-165.[11]肖星，陈婵.激励水平，约束机制与上市公司股权激励计划[J].南开管理评论,2013,16(1):24-32.[12]SHLEIFER A, R W VISHNY.Politicians and firms[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics，1994(11):995-1026.[13]BOUBAKRI N，J COSSET, W SAFFAR.The role of state and foreign owners in corporate risk-taking：evidence from privatization[J]. Journal of Finance and Economics,2013(11):641-658.[14]LAFFONTJJ, JTIROLE.A Theory of incentives in procurement and regulation[M].MIT Press,1993.[15]GUPTAN.Partial privatization and firm performance[J].Journal of Finance，2005(60):987-1015.[16]陈霞,马连福,丁振松.国企分类治理、政府控制与高管薪酬激励——基于中国上市公司的实证研究[J].管理评论，2017（3）：147-156.[17]JENSENMC, MECKLING WH.Theory of the firm:managerial behavior，agency costs and ownership structure[J].Journal of Financial Economics，1976,3(4):305-360．[18]尹美群,盛磊,李文博.高管激励、创新投入与公司绩效——基于内生性视角的分行业实证研究[J].南开管理评论，2018（1）：109-117.[19]马连福,王丽丽,张琦.混合所有制的优先序列：市场的逻辑[J].中国工业经济，2015（7）：5-19.[20]周铭山,张倩倩．面子工程”还是“真才实干”——基于政治晋升激励下的国有企业创新研究[J].管理世界，2016(12):116-188.[21]BEBCHUK LA,FRIED JM.Executive compensation as an agency problem[J].Journal of Economic Perspectives,2003,17(7):71-92.[22]吕长江,郑慧莲,严明珠,等.上市公司股权激励制度设计:是激励还是福利[J].管理世界,2009(9):133-147.[23]CHANGX,FUK,LOWA, et al.Non-executive employeestock options and corporate innovation[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2015,115(1):168-188.[24]MANSO G.Motivatinginnovation[J].The Journal of Finance,2011,66(5):1823-1860. |
|
|
|
