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| Employee Ownership, Information Transparency and Enterprise Innovation |
| Huang Pingping,Jiao Yuehua |
| (School of Accounting，Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, Wuhan 430073,China) |
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Abstract Since the China securities regulatory commission relaunched the ESOP in June 2014, more than 8% of listed companies have launched ESOP plans. This paper takes the A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2017 as the research sample, and based on the research framework of DID at multiple time points, it is used to control the existing endogenous problems. This paper empirically tests the impact of ESOP on the innovation activities of enterprises, so as to reveal the real effect of ESOP under the background of China's mixed-ownership reform. The empirical study found that enterprises with ESOP have higher innovation output than those without ESOP. And the promotion effect is more significant in enterprises with higher information transparency; Compared with state-owned enterprises, the implementation of ESOP in non-state-owned enterprises plays a stronger role in promoting innovation activities. Further analysis shows that, by testing the mechanism through the intermediary effect, the implementation of ESOP can improve the innovation willingness of the management and thus promote the innovation input, while the subscription of ESOP shares from employees' own funds will hinder the enterprise from carrying out innovation activities. The research of this paper reveals the possible mechanism of the influence of ESOP on enterprise innovation activities, and provides some enlightenment for investors to understand the role of ESOP in corporate governance.
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Received: 12 August 2019
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