[1] FILATOTCHEV I,PIESSE J.R&D,internationalization and growth of newly listed firms: european evidence[J]. Journal of International Business Studies,2009,40(8)：1260-1276. [2] 万源星,许永斌.高新认定办法、研发操纵与企业技术创新效率[J].科研管理,2019,40(4):54-62. [3] 杨国超,刘静,廉鹏,等.减税激励、研发操纵与研发绩效[J].经济研究,2017,52(8):110-124. [4] 朱红军,王迪,李挺.真实盈余管理动机下的研发投资决策后果——基于创新和税收的分析视角[J].南开管理评论,2016,19(4):36-48，86. [5]楚有为.审计委员会专业背景与企业研发活动盈余操纵[J].现代财经(天津财经大学学报),2018,38(10):96-113. [6]胡元木,刘佩,纪端.技术独立董事能有效抑制真实盈余管理吗——基于可操控R&D费用视角[J].会计研究,2016，37(3):29-35,95. [7]苑泽明,王培林,富钰媛.高管学术经历影响企业研发操纵了吗[J].外国经济与管理,2020,42(8):109-122. [8]徐成凯,金宇,富钰媛.私募股权投资与企业研发操纵：监督还是合谋——基于高技术企业的实证分析[J].山西财经大学学报,2020,42(8):114-125. [9] 杨清香,张翼,张亮.董事会特征与盈余管理的实证研究——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].中国软科学,2008，23(11):133-140. [10] LAU D C,MURNIGHAN J K. Demographic diversity and faultlines： the compositional dynamics of organizational groups[J]. Academy of Management Review,1998,23(2)：325-340. [11] 李维安,刘振杰,顾亮.董事会异质性、断裂带与跨国并购[J].管理科学,2014,27(4):1-11. [12] 周建,李小青,杨帅.任务导向董事会群体断裂带、努力程度与企业价值[J].管理学报,2015,12(1):44-52. [13] 梁上坤,徐灿宇,王瑞华.董事会断裂带与公司股价崩盘风险[J].中国工业经济,2020,37(3):155-173. [14] 梁上坤,徐灿宇,赵刚.董事会断裂带与高管私有收益[J].经济科学,2021，43(1):69-82. [15] SZYMON KACZMAREK, SATOMI KIMINO, ANNIE PYE. Board task-related faultlines and firm performance: a decade of evidence[J]. Corporate Govenrance,2012,20（4）:337-351. [16] BEZRUKOVA K,JEHN K A,ZANUTTO E L,et al. Do workgroup faultlines help or hurt? a moderated model of faultlines, team identification, and group performance[J]. Organization Science, 2009, 20 (1):35-50. [17] LI J,HAMBRICK D C. Factional groups:a new vantage on demographic faultlines, conflict, and disintegration in workteams[J]. Academy of Management Journal, 2005(48):794-813. [18] VAN PETEGHEM M, BRUYNSEELS L, GAEREMYNCK A. Beyond diversity: a tale of faultlines and frictions in the board of directors[J]. The Accounting Review,2018,93(2):339-367. [19] GIBSON C, VERMEULEN F A. Healthy divide: subgroups as a stimulus for team learning behavior[J]. Administrative Science Quarterly, 2003, 48(2): 202-239. [20] HUTZSCHENREUTER T,HORSTKOTTE J. Performance effects of top management team demographic faultlines in the process of product diversification[J]. Strategic Management Journal,2013,34(6):704-726. [21] THATCHER S M B, PATEL P C. Group faultlines: a review, integration, and guide to future research[J]. Journal of Management, 2012,38(4):969-1009. [22] 马连福,张燕,高塬.董事会断裂带与公司创新战略决策——基于技术密集型上市公司的经验数据[J].预测,2018,37(2):37-43. [23] 王晓亮,邓可斌.董事会性别断裂带与资本结构决策效率提升[J].经济管理,2020,42(11):160-176. [24] 谢德仁,姜博,刘永涛.经理人薪酬辩护与开发支出会计政策隐性选择[J].财经研究,2014,40(1):125-134. [25] 苑泽明,史方,金宇.政府创新补助的激励扭曲效应——基于我国上市公司研发操纵行为的检验[J].软科学,2020,34(2):39-43，58. [26] CRUCKE S, KNOCKAERT M. When stakeholder representation leads to faultlines: a study of board service performance in social enterprises[J]. Journal of Management Studies, 2016, 53(5): 768-793. [27] 张会丽,吴有红.内部控制、现金持有及经济后果[J].会计研究,2014(3):71-78，96. [28] 逯东,朱丽.市场化程度、战略性新兴产业政策与企业创新[J].产业经济研究,2018，17(2):65-77. [29] GUNNY K A. The relation between earnings management using real activities manipulation and future performance：evidence from meeting earnings benchmark[J]. Contemporary Accounting Research,2010(3):855-888. [30] HAANS R F J, PIETERS C, HE Z L. Thinking about U: theorizing and testing U-and inverted U-shaped relationships in strategy research[J]. Strategic Management Journal,2016,37(7):1177-1195. [31] 顾鸣润,杨继伟,余怒涛.产权性质、公司治理与真实盈余管理[J].中国会计评论,2012,10(3):255-274. [32] 梁上坤,徐灿宇,王瑞华.和而不同以为治:董事会断裂带与公司违规行为[J].世界经济,2020,43(6):171-192. [33] 袁春生,李琛毅.董事会群体断裂带、股权集中度与公司创新战略——来自创业板上市公司的证据[J].科技进步与对策,2019,36(14):99-107. [34] 祝继高,叶康涛,陆正飞.谁是更积极的监督者:非控股股东董事还是独立董事[J].经济研究,2015,50(9):170-184.
