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| The Influence of CEO Overpayment on Enterprise Innovation:A theoretical Model of Dual Motivation Integration |
| Liu Xin,Wang Jie |
| (School of Economic and Management, Hebei University of Technology, Tianjin 300400,China) |
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Abstract China is in the stage of high-quality economic development, and the Chinese government is endeavoring to strengthen the dominant position of enterprises in innovation.The active participation and promotion of entrepreneurs are essential for enterprise innovation.How to better stimulate the enthusiasm of enterprises for innovation and motivate the CEOs to increase the investment in innovation has become the focus of Chinese academic and practical circles.The existing studies have confirmed that the motivations and preferences of CEOs' strategic choices change under the influence of different salary incentive levels.Then what is the motivation of the CEOs' innovation investment with the incentive of salary? Especially when the CEO is overpaid, what is his/her decision on enterprise innovation investment? What is the mechanism behind it?#br#This paper integrates the self-determination theory and social exchange theory, and takes Chinese A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2020 as research samples to explore the relationship between CEO overpayment and enterprise innovation investment, as well as the impact of slack resources and enterprise life cycle as situational factors.Through the innovative construction of the dual motivation model of "self-interest and enterprise (industry)", it is found that the dual motivation of CEO overpayment based on "self-interest and enterprise (industry)" can promote enterprise innovation investment;slack resources positively adjust the relationship between CEO overpayment and enterprise innovation investment, and slack resources provide support to implement innovation decisions and strengthen CEOs' innovation willingness, and the enterprise life cycle negatively adjusts the relationship between CEO overpayment and enterprise innovation investment.The longer the enterprise is founded, the organizational structure tends to be more rigid, and the innovation capability decreases, and it is difficult to meet the dual motivations of CEO "self-interest and enterprise (industry)" to promote innovation.#br#As far as the authors know, to date this is the first analysis to link CEO overpayment with enterprise innovation investment,and construct a dual motivation model of "self-interest and enterprise (industry)" that affects enterprise innovation, and therefore it enriches the relevant research on CEO overpayment and enterprise innovation investment.Then in terms of research paradigm, this paper breaks the research paradigms of "cause (CEO overpayment)-result" and "cause-result (enterprise innovation investment)", explores the analysis idea of "cause (CEO overpayment)-motivation-means (enterprise innovation investment)", and uses the mediating effect model to empirically test the path realization mechanism of enterprise innovation as a strategic means for CEOs to realize the motivation of "self-interest and enterprise (industry)".Moreover this paper introduces slack resources and enterprise life cycle as regulatory variables to analyze the influence mechanism of CEO overpayment on enterprise innovation investment from the perspectives of resource dependence and life cycle, which advances the understanding of CEOs' enterprise decision-making situational factors.#br#The corresponding suggestions for the government, enterprises, CEO and the board of directors are proposed.(1) Governments at all levels should provide enterprises with a high-quality institutional environment, promote innovative resources to enterprises and enhance the conversion rate of innovative achievements so as to effectively promote the transformation and upgrading of enterprises.(2) As far as enterprises are concerned,they are inspired to realize innovation from the aspects of production operation, marketing, organizational structure, business model and so on.Innovation enables enterprises to improve business efficiency and achieve core competitiveness.(3) CEOs should cultivate their own innovation consciousness, attach importance to the role of R&D innovation, seize the opportunity of enterprise innovation, and make scientific decisions conducive to the long-term development of the enterprise according to their own resources and development cycles, so that enterprises can truly improve quality and efficiency and high-quality development.(4) The board of directors should formulate a scientific and reasonable salary system to encourage CEOs, so as to effectively integrate the salary incentive mechanism with the innovation incentive mechanism, and it is necessary to introduce the mechanism to restrain innovation risks into the salary system so as to avoid possible losses in innovation due to the low tolerance of the overpayment risk.#br#
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Received: 16 August 2022
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