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| Governance Effect of Patent Structure of Institutional Shareholding: The Perspective of Innovation Ecology |
| Du Tingting |
| (Postdoctoral Station of Theoretical Economics of Shenzhen University, Shenzhen 518000, China) |
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Abstract In recent years, some institutional investors have become the initiators of the proliferation of "pseudo innovation", which has increased the risk of the vicious circle of capital market and scientific and technological innovation. According to the patent type and structure data, there may have been a certain degree of bubble risk in the scientific and technological innovation activities of Chinese enterprises, and the patent quality tends to deteriorate. The unidirectional and linear causal logic commonly used in previous studies makes it difficult to reach a consensus conclusion of "positive correlation or negative correlation" in a universal sense when explaining how institutional investment affects the patent behavior of companies. Within the theoretical framework of innovation ecosystem, enterprise innovation activity is a dynamic and systematic evolution process in which a variety of internal and external factors interact with each other through complex mechanisms such as two-way causality, nonlinear feedback relationship between system subjects, and abrupt fluctuations of the whole system. It is not a simple one-way linear correlation. Drawing on the theory of innovation ecosystem, this paper discusses the interaction logic between institutional investment and enterprise patent behavior in terms of the formation and governance of patent bubble.#br#This paper selects the data of listed companies in 2016 and 2020 to form a grouped sample, and constructs a theoretical framework to depict the internal and external circulation mechanisms of the innovation ecosystem. From the configuration perspective, the fsQCA method is used to explore the logic and mechanism of the association between institutional investment and enterprise patent behavior in a complex system composed of multiple factors, such as market structure, industry characteristics, innovation scale, property right quality, equity structure and financial status.#br#The research in this paper shows that the "preferential effect" of institutional investment is diversified, and there are multiple differential equivalent paths in the mechanism of institutional investment affecting patent quality. The patent structure of enterprises with high-quality innovation characteristics, such as high-tech industries, high growth and high innovation scale, is positively related to the proportion of institutional investment. The composition and mechanism of the multiple equivalent "causal chain" of institutional investment and patent structure are limited by specific combination scenarios: in the case of the combination of complex factors such as high-tech enterprise identification policies, the nature of shareholders, the nature of property rights and the characteristics of equity structure, the specific correlation mechanism between institutional investment, and the patent structure is heterogeneous. There is no "positive" or "negative" correlation characteristic in the general sense between institutional investment and patent structure. In the high-tech industry, the number of invention patents as a conditional variable widely exists in the low patent bubble configuration under various scenarios as a core condition. The factor of innovation scale can be regarded as an important target, that is, it can be roughly believed that the probability of negative correlation between institutional investment and the degree of patent bubble is greater when the innovation scale is larger.#br#This paper enriches the assumption of one-way and linear deterministic causality between variables commonly used in relevant research and the study from the perspective of exploring the interaction law between technological innovation behavior and institutional investment at the theoretical level, and creatively analyzes the deep logic of the complex correlation mechanism between institutional investment and patent structure under the theoretical framework of innovation ecosystem. The research in this paper initially constructs a general theoretical framework for further exploring the virtuous cycle mechanism of scientific and technological innovation and capital market within the framework of ecosystem theory and multi-system co-evolution theory, and provides policy reference for the differential orientation of industrial policy and the virtuous cycle mechanism of scientific and technological innovation.#br#
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Received: 15 July 2022
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