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| Crowd Innovation Space Delisting: Institutional Effectiveness and Inhibition Effect |
| Li Hao1,2,Hu Haiqing3 |
| (1.Business School,Gansu University of Political Science and Law;2.Governance Research Center for Business Incubation,Gansu University of Political Science and Law, LanZhou 730070, China;3.School of Economic and Management, Xi′an University of Technology, Xi′an 710054, China) |
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Abstract As the bridgehead of entrepreneurial economy, the incubation performance of crowd innovation spaces is related to the future economic vitality of the country, and an important endogenous driving force for China's high-quality economic development. Thanks to the increasing national direct investment and policy support, crowd innovation spaces, as the main beneficiary of the "double-venture" strategy, has gradually developed a high degree of policy dependency. Academics have revealed the value creation mechanism of crowd innovation spaces from the perspectives of joint innovation, resource integration and entrepreneurial networks. It is noteworthy that the identity of policy carriers has received the attention and affirmation of many scholars. But unfortunately, the hypothetical premise of passive beneficiaries of policies does not adequately portray the dynamism in the rational decision-making process of crowd innovation spaces, and the lack of subjective motivation judgments is an important cause of contextual distortion in the analysis of exogenous influencing elements, including institutions. The promulgation and implementation of a series of delisting system from local to national level signify the trend of reforming China's business incubation policy towards elitism. It should be emphasized that the concept of elitist incubation does not only refer to nurturing outstanding start-ups, and its screening mechanism to help strengthen and support the best is also a test for the quality development of start-up incubators. However, the existing studies do not clearly state whether there is a definite link among the fluctuation of industry performance, the enactment of the new regime and the subsequent trend of crowdsourcing spaces. This is the key to determining the effectiveness of the delisting system for crowd innovation spaces at the market level.
In order to answer the question if the delisting system of crowd innovation spaces achieve the desired effect, from the economic perspective of incubation performance and the speculations perspective of catering tendency, this study examines the effectiveness of the delisting system of crowd innovation spaces and its inhibitory effects with the double difference method (DID) based on the research data of the crowd innovation space industry in Jiangsu Province from 2016-2021. The empirical results show that the delisting system has a significant but weaker boosting effect on incubation performance and incentive effect on technological innovation activities in crowd innovation spaces. The dynamic study further confirms that this positive institutional effectiveness has a significant long term effect, but the incentive effect is showing a tightening trend. It is clear that the delisting of crowd innovation spaces is a sustainable institutional innovation, but its institutional effectiveness has not been fully exploited. Secondly, crowd innovation spaces have a catering tendency for speculation and crowding-out effect on incubation performance. The empirical evidence suggests that the catering tendency to the needs of the entrepreneurial community inhibits the performance of incubation by "crowding out" entrepreneurial services. This explains again the weak performance of the listing system for crowd innovation spaces in terms of its contribution to incubation performance. The study has also found that the level of accreditation, nature of ownership, location, time of establishment and number of staff served all have different degrees of impact on incubation performance.
Possible contributions to the study's findings are that firstly industries with high policy dependence are often considered by academics as passive recipients of institutions, and research on how to enhance institutional effectiveness has developed into a top-down (macro) research paradigm. In fact, however, institutional innovation and the release of its effectiveness ultimately need to be valorized through micro-organizations. As a result, behavior in the 'system-behavior-performance' research framework is also understood as 'following the rules' and 'doing what you are told', and the subjective initiative of the actors is ignored under these assumptions. To this end, this study uses the rational adverse selection behavior of crowd innovation spaces to reveal the triggering mechanism for the limited effectiveness of the delisting system, and its possible negative binding effects provide a practicable basis for decision-making on institutional innovation and its effectiveness prognosis. Secondly under the pressure of economic transformation, institutional innovation requires conceptual change. This study takes the effectiveness of the delisting system as new perspective to dialectically demonstrate the value of the elite-style incubation concept in practice, providing valid empirical evidence for exploring the path of quality development in China.
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Received: 25 July 2022
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