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Does the D&O Liability Insurance Affect the Persistence of Corporate Innovation? |
Liu Yongli1,2,Zhang Fangshu1 |
(1.School of Business,Zhengzhou University of Aeronautics,Zhengzhou 450046,China;2. Collaborative Innovation Center of Aviation Economy Development of Henan Province,Zhengzhou 450046,China) |
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Abstract Innovation persistence is crucial for enterprises in the increasingly complex and variable external environment. On a micro-level, innovation persistence is the basis for enterprises to gain dynamic competitive advantages, while on a macro-level, it is the key to the implementation of their innovation-driven strategy in China. However, in the context of expanding economic globalization and open innovation, the lack of scientific and technological innovation has become one of the main constraints on the sustainable development of late-developing economies. How to maintain innovation continuity, enhance innovation momentum, and promote the overall effectiveness of the innovation system to continue to improve are the issues worthy of serious consideration in China.#br#There are many factors that determine the persistence of innovation. As an effective prior institutional arrangement and safeguard measure, D&O liability insurance can be used to reduce the failure of innovation decision-making by executives to enhance the risk-bearing ability of management, and it has a key impact on the choice of corporate strategy and the stable implementation of the strategy, which in turn positively impacts the persistence of innovation. However, in the existing research on the economic consequences of D&O liability insurance, few scholars have paid attention to the impact on innovation persistence. The managerial power determines the speed of response to environmental changes and the development of the firm's relationship network, while innovation persistence highly depends on managerial judgment and sustained attention, so it is necessary to examine the moderating role of managerial power in the relationship between D&O liability insurance and innovation persistence. Internal control influences the adaptability of strategic decisions, the speed and intensity of disruption, and closely relates to corporate innovation persistence strategies; meanwhile, financing constraints determine the allocation of innovation resources and the involvement in all aspects of the initiation and maintenance of innovation. Therefore,this study aims to explore the mediating path of D&O liability insurance affecting innovation persistence from the perspectives of internal control and financing constraints. In addition, there may be different impacts on firms' innovation persistence from different financial distress situations, different protection levels of intellectual property and government subsidies. In summary, this paper proposes research hypotheses and develops corresponding research models. To further verify the reliability of the hypotheses and models, this study selects the samples of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share companies from 2015 to 2021, and obtains 14 228 valid observations after data processing. Empirical analyses such as descriptive statistics, regression analysis, endogeneity analysis and robustness tests are conducted using the software of Stata 16.0.#br#The results show that D&O liability insurance has a facilitating effect on firms' innovation persistence; the positive effect of D&O liability insurance on innovation persistence diminishes as managers' power increases; internal control and financing constraints play multiple serial mediated effects between &O liability insurance on innovation persistence; and the facilitating effect of D&O liability insurance on firms' innovation persistence is more significant in the samples of firms with financial distress, high levels of intellectual property rights protection and high levels of government subsidies. #br#There are three innovative aspects of this paper. Firstly, the impact of D&O liability insurance on corporate innovation persistence is analyzed from the perspective of D&O liability insurance, which extends the study of innovation persistence factors; secondly, the multiple serial mediation effect model is introduced to study the serial mediation effect of internal control and financing constraints, which further reveals the impact path of D&O liability insurance on corporate innovation persistence; thirdly, the moderating effect of managers' power is included, which enriches the influence of D&O liability insurance on corporate innovation persistence, and it is a useful addition to the research in the field of managerial power. The conclusion can help Chinese listed companies make better use of the D&O liability insurance system to optimize their corporate innovation strategies and enhance corporate innovation persistence in the context of economic transformation and upgrading.#br#
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Received: 06 May 2023
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