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| Government Funding, Misallocationof Innovative Human Resource and Regional Innovation Performance: A Threshold Effect Analysis |
| Chen Zitao1,Meng Fanrong2,Zhang Runqiang2 |
| (1.School of International and Public Affairs, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai 200030,China; 2.School of Public Policy and Administration, Xi'an Jiaotong University, Xi'an 710049,China) |
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Abstract Talents are the primary resource for innovation and have the important role in China’s innovation-driven development strategy (IDDS). China has been developing the national innovation system dominated by government with enterprises as the basic units, along with intensive pursuit for the improvement of innovation human resource (IHR). In spite of the remarked achievements on S&T innovation, several institutional and historic problems about developmental modes occur accordingly. The market mechanism tends to fall into dysfunction because innovative activities have prominent characteristics of strong externality, high cost and risks. #br#Government invention is believed to be the compensatory approach to coping the dysfunction of market mechanism and optimizing resource allocation, with the ultimate objective of improving regional innovation performance (RIP). Government funding (GF) is the common form the government invention in practice. However, the government mechanism is actually imperfect and possibly comes into dysfunction. GF may fail in resource allocation and could cause other related problems. There are rich literature from different perspective focusing on the relationship between GF and innovation, providing diverse quantitative evidences that result in different conclusions. However, few have tapped into the context and the goal of GF. The conditionity of the impact of GF and the heterogeneity of its impact on innovation activities are not fully considered. #br#This paper focuses on the relationship of GF and RIP and carries out empirical analysis on Chinese regional statistical data. The misallocation of IHR (MIHR) is considered as the significant contextual factors into the relationship. Three hypotheses are proposed. The first is about the negative effect of MIHR on RIP for the dysfunction of market mechanism. The second supposes the positive relationship of GF and RIP, because the government invention is expected to improve innovation activity, even though there is possibility of negative consequences. The third describes the threshold effect of MIHR in the relationship of GF and RIP and try to provide an integrated explanation on the inhibition- and promotion- views in literatures.#br#The dataset used in this paper is the panel data of 30 provincial areas from 2010-2019. The data is from China’s S&T Statistical Yearbook, China National Bureau of Statistics and public reports. The region is considered as the suitable unit for studying innovation in China because of the agglomeration tendency of innovation activities. Econometric models about linear regression and threshold regression are established and controls other relevant factors, including regional development, technology market, institutional environment and international cooperation. The results show no matter if the temporal effect is controlled, MIHR has negative effect on RIP both in the results of linear regression models and threshold regression model. The insufficient allocation of innovation human resource is the main obstacle for regional innovation activities. The results also provide evidences on the threshold effect of MIHR in the relationship of GF and RIP. The result of double-threshold regression model show that GF could improve RIP when innovative human resource is insufficient or lightly undue, while it plays a negative role when innovative human resource is seriously overwhelmed. According tothe estimation thresholds of MIHR, GF plays a positive role in two-thirds of regions and strongly or weakly fails in others. #br#The findings also provide suggestions for Chinese government to play a better role in the nation innovation system and contribute to improve the implementation of IDDS in the period of the 14th Five-Year Plan and long-range objectives through the year of 2035. The first suggestion is to establish a dynamic monitoring system of IHR and its mismatch. It could provide basic information for local governments to adjustment the strategies of funding in innovation. The second suggestion emphases the importance of a hierarchical classification tool system for government funding in innovation activities, for it helps the government to adapt the status of MIHR. The third is about the improvement of regional collaborative innovation to allocate innovation IHR more flexibly. The local governments should strengthen the construction of regional S&T innovation communities to optimize the IHR sharing and cooperation mechanism.#br#
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Received: 25 October 2021
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