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| Control or Participate? State-owned Equity and Dual Innovation of Private Enterprises: The Perspective of Reverse Mixed-ownership Reform |
| Liu Ning,Zhang Honglie |
| (College of Business, Yunnan University of Finance and Economics, Kunming 650221, China) |
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Abstract The reversal of state-owned capital into private enterprises is one of the ways to implement mixed-ownership reform in China, and it is an innovative way to change the state-owned capital supervision model from managing enterprises to managing capital. The goal of reverse mixed-ownership reform is to achieve long-term effective cooperation between state-owned and private enterprises rather than short-term opportunism. However, most of the private enterprises with state-owned equity have not shown great innovation dynamics and innovation performance. How state-owned equity affects the incremental and disruptive innovation ability of private firms remains a mystery. This paper is concerned with the question of whether and how state-owned equity which carries the genes of the administrative system, can achieve effective cooperation with private shareholders. The theoretical analysis reveals that the key to enhancing the innovation performance of reverse mixed-ownership reform lies in the reasonable control of the intervention degree of state-owned shareholders in the innovation management of private enterprises.#br#This paper empirically tests the regression model based on the data of private listed companies with state-owned capital. The results show that subordinate state-owned equity has a catalytic effect on both incremental and disruptive innovation capabilities of private firms. The innovation planning of private entrepreneurs follows a progressive process from innovation attempt (incremental) to innovation exploration (subversive). As long as the innovation willingness, vitality, and decision-making power of private entrepreneurs are not diluted, private entrepreneurs will not give up the started incremental innovation activities because of state-owned equity, instead they will continue to follow up the innovation input and extend the vertical innovation chain (incremental innovation). With the improvement of the innovation intensity that private enterprises can bear after the introduction of state-owned equity, private entrepreneurs may integrate superior resources to carry out horizontal innovation exploration (subversive innovation). Conversely, controlling state-owned equity hinders the improvement of dual innovation capacity in private enterprises. On the one hand, controlling state ownership interferes with private entrepreneurs' judgment of market innovation opportunities, breaks their innovation autonomy and independence, and thus hinders private enterprises' progressive innovation. On the other hand, controlling state ownership injects rigid organizational management elements and innovation inertia into private enterprises, which are not conducive to sustainable disruptive innovation. As a result, private entrepreneurs become dependent on the state capital andstagnant in innovation. Therefore, it is necessary to avoid the interference of state-owned equity in the innovation consciousness and self-confidence of private entrepreneurs, and ensure the autonomy and independence of private entrepreneurs in innovation management. Further study finds that the higher the level of marketization, the stronger the promoting effect of participatory state-owned equity on private firms' dual innovation, while the weaker the hindering effect of controlling state-owned equity on private firms' dual innovation capability. It can be seen that the level of marketization has weakened the negative effect of controlling state-owned equity while promoting the positive effect of subordinate state-owned equity on the dual innovation of private enterprises. Therefore, China needs to speed up the construction of a large unified national market with high efficiency, fair competition and full openness, so as to give full play to the innovative effect of state-owned equity.#br#The precondition of releasing the innovation promotion effect of state-owned equity is to avoid the interference of entrepreneurs' innovation consciousness and value judgment by the over-confident decision-making logic of administrative management. The contributions of this paper are as follows.First, the empirical results suggest that state-owned equity has two sides to private firms' incremental and disruptive innovations, namely, the positive innovation effect of subordinate state-owned equity and the negative innovation effect of controlling state-owned equity. This finding breaks with previous studies that simply emphasized the positive innovation effects of state equity. Second, by analyzing the mechanism of the influence of state-owned equity on private firms' incremental and disruptive innovation, this paper points out that the level of marketization has the effect of promoting the strengths and avoiding the weaknesses of state-owned equity, i.e., promoting the positive innovation effect of participatory state-owned equity and weakening the negative innovation effect of controlling state-owned equity. This finding provides evidence to clarify the management boundary of state-owned shareholders in private firms' innovation. Thirdly, the findings provide theoretical and empirical evidence for the construction of an efficient collaborative innovation mechanism for state-owned and private enterprises.#br#
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Received: 20 April 2022
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