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| Mechanism of Status Competition on Team Innovation in Creative Team：Based on the Perspective of Solving Public Goods Dilemma and Team Trust |
| Zhang Shaofeng1,2,Chen Yuting3,Zhang Biao1,Wu Yuanpeng3 |
| （1.Party School of Anhui Provincial Committee of C.P.C（Anhui Academy of Governance）, Hefei 230022, China;2.School of Management, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230026, China;3.School of Management, Nanjing University, Nanjing 210093, China） |
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Abstract It has become inevitable to have internal benign competition and effective cooperation of innovative enterprises for the survival and development of organizations in the society full of uncertainties and risks. Compared with individual innovation, team innovation involves a complex political process of conflicts and benefit distribution. Sociologists believe that the key factor affecting team innovation is to identify and solve the dilemma of organizational public goods. Knowledge sharing and risk taking are typical public goods in organizational learning and innovation, and they have economic externalities. In order to stimulate and improve team innovation, it is necessary to understand and solve the dilemma of public goods in team innovation. There is heat discussion on the mechanism of promoting team innovation at home and abroad, yet few scholars have conducted researches on the process of team innovation from the perspective of public goods in China, or the mechanism to solve the dilemma of team public goods.#br#One of the solutions to the dilemma of public goods, introduced by the Social Cooperation School, is contribution revenue adjustment, that is, to provide a selective incentive or reward based on employee behaviors. Intangible benefits such as status, power and reputation are becoming the high-level pursuit of modern people. Status competition in team activities is emerging. In terms of motivation types, status competition can be divided into prestige status competition under prosocial motivation and dominant status competition under egoistic motivation. Motivation theory holds that there are significant differences in a series of organizational behaviors among employees with different motivations, so the status competition behaviors of innovators with different motivations may have a differentiated impact on the supply of team public goods and team innovation. Meanwhile, team activities are shaped by organizational context, and team trust is an important situational factor affecting employee behaviors. Team trust is a kind of action willingness of employees to have positive expectations for other individuals in the team and accept corresponding risks, and it affects the expectation level of others' intentions and behaviors, including threat trust and relational trust. The theory of trait activation holds that there is a deep internal connection between people and situations, which can make latent traits express explicit behaviors. Different types of organizational trust affect the stimulation of individual traits, and promote the behaviors of alienation in status competition, which has an impact on the supply of team public goods. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to explore the internal mechanism of status competition affecting team public goods supply and team innovation, analyze the mediating effect of knowledge sharing and risk taking on different status competition and team innovation, and investigate the moderating effect of team trust.#br#Taking a large cultural company in Jiangsu province as the research object, this study collects 233 paired samples from 29 teams and tests the research hypothesis based on hierarchical regression analysis and simple slope analysis. There are the following findings. The prestige status competition has a positive impact on team innovation. Dominant status competition negatively affects team innovation. Knowledge sharing and risk taking are the mediating mechanisms of status competition affecting team innovation. Prestige status competition can effectively solve the dilemma of team public goods. Relational trust positively moderates the relationship between prestige status competition, knowledge sharing and risk taking. Threat trust negatively moderates the relationship between prestige status competition and risk taking, and positively moderates the relationship between dominant status competition and knowledge sharing.#br#In terms of theoretical contribution, this study firstly identifies two important public goods in team innovation from the perspective of sociology, namely, knowledge sharing and risk taking, and promotes the understanding of team public goods. Secondly, based on intangible incentive method, this study verifies that position-level incentive can effectively solve the public goods dilemma in innovation, and expands the boundary application of trait activation theory in team public goods supply. Finally, this study reveals the significant differences of motivation and behavior among individuals by explaining the connotation of status competition under different status concern motivations and the internal mechanism of how status competition affects team innovation, and to some extent explains the divergence of existing studies on the effect of status competition. In addition, it provides insights for managers to understand status competition, promote team innovation and enhance trust in practice.#br#
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Received: 29 March 2021
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