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| Common Institutional Ownership and Enterprise Innovation:from the Perspective of Collaborative Governance and Information Sharing |
| Zeng Chunhua,Lin Yifeng |
| (School of Management, Hainan University, Haikou 570228,China) |
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Abstract Innovation is not only an important source of promoting economic transformation and economic growth, but also a key source of building a company's core competitiveness and long-term driving force.The 14th Five-Year Plan and the outline of the long-term goals for 2035 clearly propose to enhance the technological innovation capabilities of enterprises, strengthen the main position of enterprises in innovation, and promote the aggregation of various innovation elements to enterprises.However, innovation means high investment, high risk, long cycle and positive externalities, which implies that executives would take greater career risks when making innovation decisions.In order to avoid occupational risks, they are less motivated to spark innovation At the same time, the problem of information asymmetry may lead to potential moral hazard, resulting in serious financing constraints for corporate innovation activities.Institutional investors hold the equity of multiple companies in the same industry at the same time, that is, common institutional ownership.As an informal system, it has become a common phenomenon in the capital market.The proportion of listed companies in the United States establishing connections through common institutional ownership was increased from less than 10% in 1980 to 60% in 2014.Since the CSRC put forward the slogan of extraordinarily developing institutional investors, the proportion of listed companies with common institutional ownership in China has shown a gradual growth trend in the past 10 years and increased to about 12% in 2020.Common institutional investors have held an average shareholding of about 22% over the past 10 years, reaching a level where they can exert significant influence over companies.#br#An industry hub for competing companies to build economic connections,common institutional ownership can form a strong information network advantage and resource integration capability in the management and governance of multiple companies in the same industry, which may have an important impact on corporate innovation.Based on this, this paper takes Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2020 as an example, and focuses on the impact and mechanism of common institutional ownership on corporate innovation，and examines whether this impact is different due to the different marketization process and industry competition.#br#The study finds that common institutional ownership can promote enterprise innovation, and the higher the degree of connection and shareholding ratio, the more conducive to promoting enterprise innovation, and the channels for common institutional ownership to promote enterprise innovation include the play of synergistic governance effects and information sharing effects.Furthermore the promotion effect of common institutional ownership on enterprise innovation is more significant in samples with a lower degrees of marketization and a higher degree of industry competition.This shows that common institutional investors in China can bring rich private information, management knowledge and industry experience to enterprises, and give play to their strong information network advantages and supervision and governance capabilities.This can effectively alleviate the problem of principal-agent and information asymmetry, thereby reducing the lack of motivation and resources for enterprise innovation, and ultimately improving the level of enterprise innovation.At the same time, when the level of marketization in the region where the enterprise is located is low, the common institutional ownership is more able to play a synergistic governance effect, thereby promoting the innovation and development of the enterprise; and when the level of competition in the industry in which the company is located is relatively high, the more motivated by common institutional ownership is to promote the exchange of knowledge and information among portfolio companies, and exert the effect of resource sharing, thereby improving the innovation level of the enterprise.#br#This paper integrates principal-agent theory, synergy theory and the research results in the field of corporate innovation, and examines the impact of the peer effect formed by institutional investors holding the equity of multiple companies in the same industry on enterprise innovation from the perspective of horizontal correlation.This deepens the study of institutional investor governance behavior and effects.At the same time, it further reveals the mechanism of common institutional ownership affecting corporate innovation, and provides a new perspective for a comprehensive understanding of the relationship between institutional investors and corporate innovation.The research conclusions not only enrich the academic cognition of the emerging equity model of common institutional ownership, but also provide policy reference for the government to supervise and regulate the behavior of institutional investors.#br#
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Received: 28 February 2022
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