|
|
|
| How does Institutional Investor Influence Enterprise Innovation:Discussion on the Heterogeneity of Institutional Investors and Enterprises |
| Wei Shiwei1,Du Jinmin1,Wu Wenyang1,2 |
| (1.School of Economics，Jinan University，Guangzhou 510632，China;2.School of Finance, Hunan University of Technology and Business,Changsha 410205, China) |
|
|
|
Abstract The development of the A-share investor structure to institutionalization reflects the continuous and in-depth progress of the comprehensive and deep reform of China's capital market， which symbolizes the continuous improvement and maturity of China's capital market. Institutional investors push companies to pay more attention to R&D investment and innovation activities and they are are important forces in China's capital market. The impact on institutional investors on corporate innovation activities is one of the hot topics in academic research. However, current research is focused on the qualitative analysis and extended analysis of the role of institutional investors, and the research on the transmission mechanism of corporate governance is inadequate.
Existing studies have found that companies active in innovation activities tend to be less transparent. This leads to the excessive pursuit of high-risk innovation projects, intensifies the information asymmetry between external investors and the company's management, and leads to low innovation efficiency and even innovation failure. Modern corporate governance theories pointed out that the interdependence and organic combination between all interest members help achieve maximization of the value of the company and the creation of wealth. The size of institutional investors in the capital market makes them more advantageous to obtaining company's information and prefer to identify and invest in the company which has strong innovation capability. On the one hand, the close relationship between the company's performance and investment income enables institutional investors to actively strengthen the process supervision, overcome information asymmetry as well as principal-agent issues and promote the level of corporate governance. On the other hand, institutional investors pay more attention to long-term performance. Institutional investors incentivize management to goal with substantial innovation breakthroughs by tolerating failure of innovation, cost of investment and the short-term performance fluctuations, and create a good environment for enterprises innovation activities.
This paper is based on the 2007—2018 China A-share listed company data set and uses a fixed effects model for empirical testing. It innovatively incorporates corporate governance behaviors such as the effectiveness of internal control and core technical personnel's equity incentives into the theoretical analysis framework of the relationship between institutional investor's shareholding and corporate innovation. In addition, it also explores different impact on institutional investors and corporate heterogeneity on corporate innovation activities. The results show that institutional investors have significantly promoted corporate innovation. The effectiveness of internal control, equity incentives for core technical personnel and management cost control are three important transmission paths for institutional investors to promote enterprise innovation. Further research also finds that strategic institutional investors have a more prominent impact on corporate innovation than financial institutional investors; institutional investors have significantly promoted the innovation of non-state-owned enterprises. However, the impact on the overall innovation of state-owned enterprises is not significant.
Therefore, the capital market needs continuous improvement of multi-level directions and the quality of institutional investors, guiding institutional investors to participate in a larger capital market and introducing professional and high-quality institutional investors as an important supervision force. In addition, the public service department should increase innovation support for small and medium-sized private enterprises and cooperates to promote innovation and cooperation in different industries.
The contribution of the article are mainly on the following aspects. Firstly, the past research suggests the positive role of institutional investors to enterprise innovation activities with the focus on the qualitative discussion on the role of institutional investors. This paper quantitatively analyzes the relationship between institutional investors and corporate innovation performance and reveals the significant role of institutional investors in promoting corporate innovation. Secondly, the research on the transmission mechanism of internal governance levels is inadequate. This paper studies the mechanism of institutional investors acting on enterprise innovation activities from the perspective of corporate governance. Thirdly, the existing research directly discusses the relationship between the institutional shareholding and corporate innovation and has less study in heterogeneous segmentation of institutional investors and company attributes. By exploring the heterogeneity in institutional investors and enterprises, this paper enriches the research on the impact of institutional investors on enterprise innovation from the perspective of corporate governance.
|
|
Received: 05 March 2021
|
|
|
|
|
|
| [1] CHEMMANUR T J.Corporate venture capital, value creation and innovation[J].The Review of Financial Studies, 2014, 27(8):2434-2473.[2] LUONG H, MOSHIRIAN F, NGUYEN L, et al.How do foreign institutional investors enhance firm innovation [J].Journal of Financial & Quantitative Analysis, 2017, 52(4): 1449-1490.[3] 孔东民,王江元.机构投资者信息竞争与股价崩盘风险[J].南开管理评论,2016,19(5):127-138.[4] HOLMSTROM B.Agency costs and innovation [J].Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 1989, 12(3):305-327.[5] 杨鸣京,程小可,李昊洋.机构投资者调研、公司特征与企业创新绩效[J].当代财经,2018,39(2):84-93.[6] AGHION P, REENEN V J, ZINGALES L.Innovation and institutional ownership[J].The American Economic Review, 2013, 103(1):277-304.[7] 孔高文,胡林峰,孔东民,等.基金持股的创新偏好与基金业绩研究[J].管理科学学报,2019,22(12):70-83.[8] 许长新,杨李华.异质性视角下机构投资者影响企业创新的路径[J].金融经济学研究,2018,33(6):67-78.[9] GILLAN S L, STARKS L T, STARKS.Corporate governance, corporate ownership and the role of institutional investors: a global perspective[J].Journal of Applied Finance, 2003, 13(2):4-22.[10] 万赫,彭秋萍,钟熙.机构投资者异质性、CEO任期与企业突破式创新[J].科技进步与对策,2021,38(3):88-95.[11] MANSO G.Motivating Innovation[J].Journal of Finance, 2011, 66 (5): 1823-1860.[12] ALMAZAN A, HARTZELL J C, STARKS L T.Active institutional shareholders and costs of monitoring: evidence from executive compensation[J].Financial Management, 2005, 34:5-34.[13] CHEN X, HARFORD J, LI K.Monitoring: which institutions matter[J].Journal of Financial Economics, 2007, 86:279-305.[14] 张强,王明涛.机构投资者对企业创新的影响机制——来自中小创板上市公司的经验证据[J].科技进步与对策,2019,36(13):1-10.[15] 刘宁悦,杨洋.机构投资者异质性与企业自主创新[J].科学决策,2017,14(11):54-77. [16] 付雷鸣,万迪昉,张雅慧.VC是更积极的投资者吗——来自创业板上市公司创新投入的证据[J].金融研究,2012,55(10):125-138. [17] 于雪航,方军雄.“国家队”持股与企业创新投资决策[J].国际金融研究,2020,37(8):87-96.[18] 齐秀辉,卢悦,武志勇.股权特征对机构投资者与创新投入的调节作用[J].科技进步与对策,2018,35(5):14-20.[19] 温军,冯根福.异质机构、企业性质与自主创新[J].经济研究,2012,47(3):53-64.[20] 史永东,王谨乐.中国机构投资者真的稳定市场了吗[J].经济研究,2014,49(12):100-112. [21] KOCHHAR R, DAVID P.Institutional investors and firm innovation: a test of competing hypotheses[J].Strategic Management Journal, 2015, 17(1): 73-84.[22] 王乐,田高良,封华,等.联合调研网络与企业创新投入——基于机构投资者实地调研的经验证据[J].当代财经,2021,36(3):88-99. [23] 张纯,吕伟.机构投资者、终极产权与融资约束[J].管理世界,2007,23(11):119-126. [24] CHUNG R, FIRTH M, KIM J.Institutional monitoring and opportunistic earnings management[J].Journal of Corporate Finance, 2002, 8(1): 29-48.[25] 陆瑶,朱玉杰,胡晓元.机构投资者持股与上市公司违规行为的实证研究[J].南开管理评论,2012,15(1):13-23. [26] YONG S J.Institutional investment horizons and CEO compensation[J].Seoul Journal of Business, 2011, 17(1):93-135.[27] CORE J E, GUAY W R.Stock option plans for non-executive employees[J].Journal of Financial Economics, 2001,61(2):253-287.[28] 伊志宏,李艳丽,江轩宇.机构投资者具有监督作用吗——来自股权激励宣告公司的证据[C].第四届中国管理学年会——金融分会场论文集,2009:187-196.[29] 李维安,齐鲁骏,丁振松.兼听则明,偏信则暗——基金网络对公司投资效率的信息效应[J].经济管理,2017,39(10):44-61. [30] SHLEIFER A, VISHNY R.Large shareholders and corporate control[J].Journal of Political Economy, 1986, 94(3):461-488.[31] LERNER J, WULF J.Innovation and incentives: evidence from corporate R&D[J].Review of Economics and Statistics, 2007, 89(4):634-644.[32] WAHAL S, MCCONNELL J J.Do institutional investors exacerbate managerial myopia[J].Journal of Corporate Finance, 2000, 6(3):307-329.[33] HE J, TIAN X.The dark side of analyst coverage: the case of innovation[J].Journal of Financial Economics, 2013, 109(3):856- 878.[34] 张杰,陈志远,杨连星,等.中国创新补贴政策的绩效评估:理论与证据[J].经济研究,2015,50(10):4-17,33.[35] 黎文靖,郑曼妮.实质性创新还是策略性创新——宏观产业政策对微观企业创新的影响[J].经济研究,2016,51(4):60-73.[36] ELYASIANI E, JIA J.Distribution of institutional ownership and corporate firm performance[J].Journal of banking & finance, 2010, 34(3):606-620. |
|
|
|
