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| Does Policy Combination Promote the Collaborative Innovation of Civil-Invested Military Enterprises and Scientific Research Institutions:an Simulation Analysis Perspective based on Evolutionary Game |
| Zhang Lei1,Wang Xiangyu2 |
| (1.Equipment Management and UAV Engineering College, Air Force Engineering University; 2.Master Candidate at Graduate School, Air Force Engineering University, Xi'an 710053, China) |
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Abstract It is important for collaborative innovation in military and civilian science and technology to enhance the national integrated strategic system and capability and creating a favourable policy environment is an important way to promote collaborative innovation in military and civilian science and technology. A three-party game evolution model is constructed with civil-invested military enterprises, research institutes and the government as game subjects. Through systematic analysis of the influence of policy support on the strategy choice of game subjects, and numerical simulation using Matlab to analyze the influence of different policies and policy combination support on the collaborative innovation of civil-invested military enterprises and research institutes in science and technology. The study shows that: (1) the government should adopt different combinations of policy support for different innovation agents, with direct and indirect policies being more effective in encouraging innovation by civil-military enterprises, and good environmental regulation policies being more effective in promoting collaborative innovation by research institutes; (2) the government needs to adopt a reasonable combination of policies to support synergy between civil-military science and technology innovation, with a combination of medium-intensity direct and indirect policies and low-intensity environmental regulation being more effective than a single policy support for synergy between civil-invested military enterprises and scientific research institutions.
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Received: 19 July 2021
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