|
|
|
| Management Power Balance Intensity, Debt Constraint and Enterprise Innovative Investment |
| Dai Yuqing1,Li Xinhe2 |
| （1.School of Business，Xi′an University of Finance and Economics，Xi′an 710100，China；2.School of Business，Nanjing University，Nanjing 210093，China） |
|
|
|
|
Abstract Enterprise innovation is the key to the sustainable growth of the country’s economy. It is affected by the wishes of the management. Therefore, power balance of internal operators are required. Using a sample of Chinese listed companies from 2010 to 2018, this paper tests the influence of management power balance intensity to enterprise innovative investment, and the moderating effect of high commercial credit and high debt levels under different debt constraint. In addition, it also examines the differences in property. The evidence confirms that the greater the management power balance intensity, the higher the level of enterprise innovative investment. High commercial credit strengthens this promotion, while high debt levels weaken this promotion. Further researches find that the relationship between management power balance intensity and enterprise innovative investment is more significant in private enterprises. State-owned enterprises can better obtain and use commercial credit, making the strengthening effect of high commercial credit on this relationship more obvious. The stronger debt constraint of private enterprises makes the weakening effect of their high debt level on this relationship more obvious. This conclusion provides a new theoretical perspective and empirical evidence for enterprise innovation.
|
|
Received: 18 January 2021
|
|
|
|
|
|
| [1] 李小青,贾岩冰,陈阳阳. “混改”国企股权结构、董事会配置与创新绩效[J]. 科技进步与对策,2020,37(12):82-89. [2] 朱德胜,周晓珮. 股权制衡、高管持股与企业创新效率[J]. 南开管理评论,2016,19(3):136-144. [3] COLLINSON S,LIU Y P. Recombination for innovation:performance outcomes from international partnerships in China[J]. R&D Management,2019,49(1):46-63. [4] 黄毅峰. 社会冲突强度及其影响因素分析[J]. 行政论坛,2013,20(3):37-41. [5] 仲继银. 董事会与公司治理[M].北京:企业管理出版社,2018. [6] 卢馨,吴婷,张小芬. 管理层权力对企业投资的影响[J]. 管理评论,2014,26(8):168-180.[7] BLOCH F，HEGE U.Multiple shareholders and control contest [J].Working Paper, HEC School of Management，2001（5）. [8] LA PORTA R, FLORENCIO L D S, SHLCIFER A. Corporate ownership around the world [J]. The Journal of Finance,1999,54(2):471-517. [9] 赵国宇,禹薇. 大股东股权制衡的公司治理效应——来自民营上市公司的证据[J]. 外国经济与管理,2018,40(11):60-72. [10] 朱德胜. 控股股东、股权制衡与公司股利政策选择[J]. 山东大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2010,60(3):80-87. [11] KWON S S,YIN Q J. Executive compensation,investment opportunities,and earnings management:high-tech firms versus low-tech firms[J]. Journal of Accounting,Auditing & Finance,2006,21(2):119-148. [12] MAURY B,PAJUSTE A. Multiple large shareholders and firm value[J]. Journal of Banking & Finance,2005,29(7):1813-1834. [13] 杨建君,王婷,刘林波. 股权集中度与企业自主创新行为:基于行为动机视角[J]. 管理科学,2015,28(2):1-11. [14] LI J,XIA J,ZAJAC E J. On the duality of political and economic stakeholder influence on firm innovation performance:theory and evidence from Chinese firms[J]. Strategic Management Journal,2018,39(1):193-216. [15] 李姝,翟士运,古朴. 非控股股东参与决策的积极性与企业技术创新[J]. 中国工业经济,2018,36(7):155-173. [16] GUADALUPE M,KUZMINA O,THOMAS C. Innovation and foreign ownership[J]. American Economic Review,2012, 102(7): 3594-3627. [17] 陈志红,李健. 商业信用有助于中小企业绿色创新吗——基于融资约束视角[J]. 现代经济探讨,2020,39(7):70-78. [18] 陆正飞,杨德明. 商业信用:替代性融资,还是买方市场?[J]. 管理世界,2011,27(4):6-14,45. [19] 郭婧,李心合. 宏观经济波动、高风险运营资产与企业债务结构——来自中国制造业上市公司的经验证据[J]. 财经科学,2019,63(7):67-79. [20] 王彦超. 金融抑制与商业信用二次配置功能[J]. 经济研究,2014,49(6):86-99. [21] MYERS S C. Determinants of corporate borrowing[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1977,5(2):147-175. [22] 林钟高,刘捷先,章铁生. 企业负债率、研发投资强度与企业价值[J]. 税务与经济,2011,33(6):1-11. [23] 王宇峰,张娜. 政治联系、债务融资与企业研发投入——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J]. 财经理论与实践,2014,35(3):60-64. [24] 王京,王贞洁. 债务多元化与研发投入——知识产权保护与产融结合的联合调节效应[J]. 山西财经大学学报,2020,42(9):112-126. [25] 左晶晶,唐跃军,眭悦. 第二类代理问题、大股东制衡与公司创新投资[J]. 财经研究,2013,39(4):38-47. [26] 郭婧. CEO特征对公司研发投资的影响——基于上市公司2010—2014年数据的实证研究[J]. 审计与经济研究,2016,31(6):77-84. [27] 苟燕楠,董静. 风险投资背景对企业技术创新的影响研究[J]. 科研管理,2014,35(2):35-42. [28] BRANDT L,LI H B. Bank discrimination in transition economies:ideology,information,or incentives[J]. Journal of Comparative Economics,2003,31(3):387-413. [29] FABBRI D,MENICHINI A M C. Trade credit,collateral liquidation,and borrowing constraints[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2010,96(3):413-432. [30] 张新民,王珏,祝继高. 市场地位、商业信用与企业经营性融资[J]. 会计研究,2012,33(8):58-65,97. |
|
|
|
