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| Effect of Controlling Shareholder's Stocks Pledge on Firms Innovative Direction |
| Wan He1,2,Zhong Xi3,Peng Qiuping3 |
| (1.Sun Yat-sen Business School,Guangzhou 510000,China; 2.Huafa Industrial Share Co.,LTD.Zhuhai,Zhuhai 519030,China ;3.School of Business Administration,South China University of Technology,Guangzhou 510640,China) |
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Abstract The pledge of controlling shareholder stocks is a common phenomenon in China′s capital market.Scholars have launched many discussions on the impact of controlling shareholder′s stocks pledge on corporate innovation,but still have not reached a consensus conclusion.Taking China's 2003-2017 A share listed companies as the research object,we explores the logical relationship between controlling shareholders′ stocks pledge and corporate innovation from the perspective of radical innovation and incremental innovation,and further examines the contextual role of corporate stock counterbalance and corporate visibility.The results show that: Firstly,the controlling shareholder's stocks pledge will inhibit company's radical innovation,but not have a significant impact on the incremental innovation.secondly,with the increase of stock counterbalance,the inhibiting effect of stocks pledge on corporate radical innovation is strengthened first and then weakened,that is,stock counterbalance plays a U-shaped moderate role between controlling shareholder's stocks pledge and corporate radical innovation.Thirdly,corporate visibility will weaken the inhibitory effect of stocks pledge on corporate radical innovation.This study is conducive to dialectically understanding the innovative consequences of stocks pledge,and also has important implications for promoting enterprise innovation and improving corporate governance mechanisms.
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Received: 25 December 2019
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