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Antitrust Regulation toward Patent Reverse Payment Settlement:Experience in the United States and Its Implications |
Sun Yuchen |
(Law School, Renmin University of China, Beijing 100872,China) |
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Abstract In the pharmaceutical industry of the United States, the patent litigation settlement agreement which includes reverse payments from the patent holder to the alleged infringer, has aroused widespread concern. The typical purpose of this agreement is as exchange for the alleged infringer's agreement to delay or abandon market entry. The agreement is the by-product of the patent linkage system. The Supreme Court analyzed this agreement under the traditional rule of reason and hoped to reduce the cost of mistake by comprehensively evaluating various factors. However, due to the limitations of the rule of reason, the presumptive illegality approach would presumably become the most appropriate rule in the United States. In China's context, the reverse-payment agreement should be analyzed under the prohibition and exemption framework, in order to achieve the balance of competition order maintenance, innovation incentives and other values.
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Received: 06 June 2019
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