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| The Mechanisms of State Owned Enterprises' Mixed Ownership Reform Affecting Innovation Investment: Government Intervention Effect or Agency Effect |
| Xu Weibin1,Zhou Lili1,Chen Mengyuan2 |
| (1.School of Management, Guizhhou University；2.College of Tourism and Culture Industry, Guizhhou University, Guiyang 550025, China) |
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Abstract In the context of mixed ownership reform, this paper analyzes how the ownership structure affects the level of enterprise innovation investment. The study finds that improving the proportion of non-state owned equity has a promoting effect on enterprise innovation investment. When the mixed ownership structure consists of foreign shareholders, the relationship between the proportion of non-state owned equity and enterprise innovation investment level was positively correlated. But when the mixed ownership structure contains only the private shareholders, there is no statistical significance of the relationship between the proportion of non-state owned equity and enterprise innovation investment level. Further research found that t improving the proportion of non-state owned equity can affect the level of enterprise innovation investment throw two paths: agency effect of managers and the effect of government intervention, and the key mechanism is the effect of managers' agency.
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Received: 12 November 2018
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