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| New and Old CEO Duality and R&D Efficiency of State-owned Enterprises：Evidence from Chinese A-share SOEs |
| Fan Mingzhu,Wang Jing,Xu Jingna |
| (College of Management, Ocean University of China, Qingdao 266100,China) |
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Abstract R&D efficiency is an important factor for enterprises to gain competitive advantages and achieve high quality growth. With the implementation of the national innovation strategy, the proportion of R&D in China′s GDP has been increasing, and has reached the level of the advanced countries in Europe and the United States. However, compared with the world′s major innovative countries, the R&D efficiency of Chinese enterprises is still at a low level. In particular, the loss of R&D efficiency of state-owned enterprises is still greater than that of non-state-owned enterprises, which arouses scholars′ attention to the design of internal system and governance structure. Managers, as the main participants and actual operators of enterprise decisions, are the key to improving the efficiency of enterprise R&D. Corporate leadership structure and its differences are also important factors affecting the allocation of managers′ power and decision-making choices. As a specific leadership structure, the dual position of being both the chairman of the board and CEO will have a direct impact on the long-term development of enterprises. Different from the corporate governance structure in Europe and America, China has a unique corporate governance framework. As the core of the Party committee and the board of directors of enterprises, the CEO duality leadership configuration between the Party secretary and the chairman of the board of directors can regulate the management behavior from the source and alleviate the agency problem of state-owned enterprises. However there is little literature on the influences of the new CEO duality leadership structure of being chairman and Party secretary on enterprise R&D efficiency.
Therefore, this paper takes the A-share state-owned enterprises in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2008 to 2020 as samples for empirical analysis, examines the difference between the influence of the new structure (duality of secretary of the Party committee and chairman of the board) and the old one (duality of chairman of the board and CEO) on the R&D efficiency, and analyzes the mechanism of their relationship. In China′s institutional environment and governance context, this study discusses the heterogeneity of economic policy uncertainty and enterprise risk bearing capacity and other macro and micro environmental factors on the relationship between the two, and it explores whether the role of the old and new leadership configuration in state-owned enterprises on R&D efficiency will further affect the enterprise value.
The results show that (1) compared with the old leadership structure, the new structure has a more significant positive impact on the R&D efficiency of state-owned enterprises; (2) the new leadership structure can improve the operating efficiency and board efficiency of state-owned enterprises, thus improving their R&D efficiency; (3) economic policy uncertainty and enterprise risk bearing capacity have a boundary effect on the positive relationship between the new structure and enterprise R&D efficiency: when the economic policy uncertainty is higher and the enterprise risk bearing capacity is lower, the new structure has a stronger promoting effect on R&D efficiency; (4) in the state-owned enterprises, the new structure improves the corporate value by improving corporate R&D efficiency, and the effect of this enhancement is sustainable.
This paper for the first time highlights the comparison of the differences between the old and new leadership structures of on the economic behavior of listed companies under the background of China′s unique system, which is conducive to better promoting the sinicization of corporate governance theories and providing theoretical support and decision-making reference for organizational power allocation in the Chinese context. It also provides empirical evidence for the design of the leadership structure of state-owned enterprises and the optimization of technological innovation decision. Moreover this paper clarifies the unique mechanism of the chairman on enterprise R&D behavior, enriches the research literature on the relationship between the Party organization′s participation in corporate governance and enterprise R&D behavior, and provides empirical evidence for the optimization of China′s state-owned enterprises′ governance structure and improvement of R&D efficiency.
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Received: 05 July 2022
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