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| Evolution of the Market-oriented Transformation of Government-led New R&D Institutions Jointly Constructed by Local Government and University: The Perspective of Resource Dependence Theory |
| Wu Feng,Xu Wanqiang |
| (College of Public Administration, Huazhong University of Science & Technology, Wuhan 430074, China) |
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Abstract With the coming of the new era of China's development, it is essential to comprehensively deepen the reform of the science and technology system and further gather and integrate science and technology resources. New R&D institutions, as the carrier of "industry-university-research," are indispensable in promoting the reform of the scientific and technological system and achieving high-quality development. However, problems such as insufficient guarantee conditions, weak core competence, and independent development ability have restricted the innovation capability of new R&D institutions. Among them, new R&D institutions jointly built by universities and local governments have been seriously limited by these problems and their functions in business incubation and achievement transformation are impeded. For the government-led new R&D institutions jointly constructed by local governments and universities (GNI), the market-oriented transformation has become the essential path for such institutions to link the innovation chain and industrial chain effectively and reduce the R&D cost.
Although there are studies concerning the classification, function, operation mechanism, development experience, performance evaluation, and other contents of new R&D institutions, issues on the new R&D institutions jointly built by universities and local governments are still insufficient. Given this, this paper analyzes the mechanism of market-oriented transformation of government-led new R&D institutions jointly constructed by local governments and universities from the resource dependence perspective to improve the current knowledge system and provide a reference for the practice.
At first, it describes the market-oriented transformation process of the government-led new R&D institutions jointly constructed by local governments and universities, including the leading participants and their functions under the circumstance of collaborative participation, the operating mechanism of the government-led new R&D institutions jointly constructed by local government and university, and the market-oriented transformation of the institutions from the perspective of resource dependence. Second, the study constructs an evolutionary game model to analyze the strategies and stability of the participants, with local governments, universities, and enterprises as the prominent participants in the marketization transformation of government-led new R&D institutions jointly constructed by local government and university. This part consists of model hypotheses, cost and benefit analysis of the participants in market-oriented transformation, and the stability analysis of the participant's equilibrium strategies. Thirdly, it conducts a simulation analysis of the evolutionary game model with MATLAB taking the case of Ezhou Industrial Technology Research Institute of Huazhong University of Science and Technology. This part focuses on the impact of participation cost, income distribution, and speculation on the system's evolution. The results show that (1) local government is a risk seeker for market-oriented transformation, while the university and enterprise are risk averters; (2) the cost of market-oriented transformation could change the participation strategies of the three parties, but the sensitivity of each party to the cost is different; (3) income distribution of the new R&D institutions could change the result of the market-oriented transformation, and the input changes of local government could not eliminate this influence; (4) “free ridding” of enterprise is the obstacle to market-oriented transformation. Finally, it proposes strategies to promote the market-oriented transformation of government-led new R&D institutions jointly constructed by local government and university from the perspective of local government, enterprises, and universities.
The marginal contributions of this paper are as follows. (1) It describes the market-oriented transformation of GNI from the power relationship attached to the resource dependence relationship, which expanded the application scenario of resource dependence theory. (2) By constructing the evolutionary game model of market-oriented transformation of new R&D institutions with local governments, universities, and enterprises as participants, this paper enriches the research paradigm of the cooperative relationship of new R&D institutions. (3) It analyzes participation cost, income distribution, and enterprise speculation operation mechanism in the market-oriented transformation of new R&D institutions, and puts forward strategies to improve the market-oriented transformation of new R&D institutions.
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Received: 20 June 2022
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