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| The Internal Logic and System Reconstruction of the Evolution of University Patent System in China |
| Zhang Junrong1,Yang Sijie1,Zhou Lu2 |
| (1.Law School of South-Central Minzu University, Wuhan 430074, China;2.Intellectual Property School of East China University of Political Science and Law, Shanghai 201620, China) |
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Abstract Colleges and universities in China have been criticized for the long-term sluggishness of patent utilization. It is an important task of China's S&T legislation reform to improve the patent performance of colleges and universities through the reform of patent ownership system. So far China has carried out a series of reforms to the patent ownership system of colleges and universities following the legislation of the US Bayh-Dole Act. However it has not improved the patent performance of colleges and universities as expected. Addressing the above issue, this paper aims to explore the reasons for the poor performance of patents in Chinese colleges and universities according to the types of university technology R&D output by tracing the evolution process of China's colleges and universities patent ownership system and analyzing the underlying logic of the institutional evolution.#br#Through the historical analysis of patent ownership system of Chinese colleges and universities, it is found that the evolution of patent ownership system has inherited the property mechanism following the market logic. Ownership has undergone evolution and reforms from state-owned to contractual ownership, then to private ownership of colleges and universities, finally steadily inclined to inventors and designers. The process of right disposition has undergone a change from prior strong supervision of state-owned assets to post-event supervision. Although the reform of the patent ownership system in colleges and universities in China can largely avoid the "tragedy of the commons", it ignores the output types of technological R&D in colleges and universities. There might be deviations in system positioning if patent commercialization rules are used to uniformly regulate all patent output of colleges and universities. Since university patents are mostly basic patents that are not readily suitable for commercialization, the current system places too much emphasis on the goal of patent commercialization. Although it can have a strong incentive effect on inventors of applied patents, it fails to provide effective incentives for basic innovations and patents, and thus it is unable to reverse the status quo of patent transformation. Moreover too much emphasis on the incentives of patent commercialization will squeeze out the R&D space of basic patents, and distort the goals of technology R&D in colleges and universities, which is not conducive to the improvement of university patent performance.#br#In the context of China's industrial technology upgrading, harsh external environment and the need to constantly strengthen basic innovation, the designers of incentive systems should consider both the short-term and long-term incentive effects. At present, the reform of China's patent ownership system should clarify the positioning of colleges and universities as a supplier of basic technology and highlight incentives for basic innovation. On this basis, in order to fully coordinate the interests of inventors, innovators and owners, this paper puts forward the incentive measures and the reform scheme of patent ownership system with the dual goals of S&T progress and technology commercialization.#br#First of all, it is essential to highlight the importance of basic innovation and basic patents. The evaluation and reward should not be based on whether the patent is authorized. At the same time, a long-term evaluation mechanism for basic technologies and patents is a must. Special rewards can be given to those patents that belong to basic technology and lay a technological foundation for subsequent technological progress and industrial development, no matter if the patents are implemented or not. Second, the incentive system of property rights for applied patents should be further improved. With emphasis on market incentives for inventors, it is also necessary to weaken or cancel other awards for applied patents. Excessive incentives for inventors will harm public interests. Third, it is suggested to establish the classified inventor reporting system which helps to leverage the information advantages of inventors, so as to adopt different evaluation systems for basic patents and applied patents. That means universities' patent with commercialization potential can be screened out rapidly via the property right incentive mechanism, so that the patent transformation agencies can concentrate on the patent transformation. It enables universities to focus on technology R&D with real value of market application and social public, and provides an incentive and compatible institutional environment for the two types of technology R&D activities and patent output.#br#
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Received: 15 June 2022
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