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| How Relative Resource Levels Affect the Relationship between Interlocking Directorate Networks and Enterprise Innovation Investment |
| Yan Ruosen,Yuan Jing |
| (Economics and Management School, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China) |
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Abstract How do interlocking directorate networks affect enterprise innovation investment? Agency theory and resource dependence theory are two theories to test this problem.Although many existing studies have conducted in-depth research on this topic, the empirical results based on these two different theories are contradictory.These contradictory results prove that there are unresolved problems in explaining relationship between interlocking directorate networks and enterprise innovation investment from the perspective of agency theory or resource dependence theory.The failure to integrate agency theory and resource dependence theory into the same research framework of interlocking directorate networks may be the reason for the problem.In fact, both agency theory and resource dependence theory regard resources as key factors that affect organizational actions and consequences.The former insists that rich resources will magnify managers' opportunism and cause agency costs to rise, while the latter believes that the survival and development of an organization depends on its ability to obtain key resources from the outside world.To some extent, the level of resources can confirm whether interlocking directorate relationship is a means to deal with external resource dependence or a symbol of moral hazard.Therefore, the relative resource level which is the difference between the resource level of the focal enterprise and the interlocking enterprise, is an important mechanism to combine agency theory and resource dependence theory, and it can explain the current contradictory results of the relationship between the interlocking directorate networks and enterprise innovation investment.#br#Thus, this paper integrates agency theory and resource dependence theory into the same research framework through relative resource levels.It innovatively introduces network structure entropy calculated by MATLAB software programming to measure the structural embeddedness of enterprise nodes in interlocking directorate networks and uses the samples of A-share listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2010 to 2020 to explore how relative resource levels affect the relationship between interlocking directorate networks and enterprise innovation investment.The research finds that the relative resource level has a negative impact on the relationship between interlocking directorate networks and enterprise innovation investment, i.e., when the relative resource level is low, interlocking directorate networks are conducive to promoting enterprise innovation investment, that situation is in line with resource dependence theory; when the relative resource level is high, interlocking directorate networks will weaken the innovation investment of enterprises, which is in line with agency theory.That is, with the improvement of relative resource levels, the theoretical basis fitting the management situation of the relationship between interlocking directorate networks and enterprise innovation investment has gradually changed from resource dependence theory to agency theory, thus reducing resource utilization, increasing agency costs and enhancing the negative effect of interlocking directorate networks on enterprise innovation investment.#br#The possible marginal contributions of the research are presented.(1) The research integrates agency theory and resource dependence theory into a research framework through relative resource levels, describes the relationship between interlocking directorate networks and enterprise innovation investment more comprehensively and accurately, and expands the scope of interlocking directorate networks research.It also provides an effective explanation for the contradictory results of how the interlocking directorate networks affect enterprise innovation investment.(2) The research supplements the applicable conditions of agency theory and resource dependence theory.Resource dependence theory is applicable to the situation of low relative resource level, and focal enterprises use the interlocking directorate relationship as a means of managing dependence when resources are constrained.Agency theory is applicable to the situation of high relative resource level, and when resources are rich, the focal enterprises establish the interlocking directorate relationship to enhance the control of managers.This discovery provides theoretical guidance for enterprises to build more reasonable interlocking directorate networks according to practical conditions.(3) Given the fact that network structure entropy measures not only the size density of nodes, but also the intermediary utility of nodes.Compared with structural holes and centrality, network structure entropy can reflect the network structure embeddedness of nodes more comprehensively.The research introduces network structure entropy to measure the interlocking directorate networks, providing reference for subsequent related research.#br#
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Received: 27 November 2022
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