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| Government Intervention, Innovation Drive and Regional Allocation of Talents |
| Fang Yijing,Li Jing,Si Shenshen |
| (School of Economics,Anhui University, Hefei 230601, China) |
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Abstract The innovation-driven development strategy is highly valued in China. However, when promoting the implementation of the innovation-driven strategy, many local governments ignore the necessity of on-the-spot investigation, and the undifferentiated implementation of the strategy has led to the deterioration of regional innovation-driven development. General Secretary Xi Jinping has emphasized that innovation-driven development is the guarantee for high-quality economic development, and talent is the basis for achieving innovation-driven development. For a long time, the concentration of talents in the eastern region has been relatively high. At the critical moment when innovation drives and leads economic development, the effective allocation of talents is a necessary condition for the development of talents′ innovation ability. Therefore, it is necessary for the government to reasonably intervene in the allocation of talents, and guide the rational allocation of talents among industries or regions, so as to fully explore and utilize the innovation potential of talents and promote high-quality economic growth.#br#By combing the existing research, this study reveals the basic logic of government intervention and innovation-driven influence on the regional allocation of talents. Then with the help of the panel data of 258 cities in China from 2004 to 2018, the dynamic mechanism of innovation-driven promotion of regional talent allocation is discussed and a theoretical model is further constructed. The endogeneity problem between variables is eliminated by seeking instrumental variables, and then the two-stage least squares method is used to empirically test the theoretical mechanism of the study, and the semi-parametric estimation method is used to verify the robustness of the above empirical results. .#br#Considering that each region in China is quite different in terms of innovation-driven level and the intervention methods of local governments in attracting talents, the study further examines the regional heterogeneity of innovation-driven and government intervention on regional talent allocation based on the overall regression. The results of subregional regression show that after the government intervention variables are included, the effect of innovation drive on talent allocation changes to varying degrees, especially after the interaction of the two is added, and the effect of innovation drive on talent allocation is particularly obvious. Therefore, it is speculated that the effect of innovation drive on talent allocation may have a threshold effect of government intervention. Threshold regression is used to further test the impact of innovation drive on regional talent allocation at different levels of government intervention.#br#On the basis of the above analysis, this paper draws the following conclusions. First, both innovation drive and government intervention can effectively improve regional talent allocation. After adding the interactive terms of the two, it is found that both innovation drive and government intervention have further enhanced effects on regional talent allocation. Secondly, the innovation drive in the western region has the strongest positive promotion effect on regional talent allocation, followed by the eastern region, and the central region has the smallest effect. Compared with the western region, government intervention has promoted the improvement of the level of talent allocation, but its effect has shown the opposite effect in the central region and inhibited regional heterogeneity. Finally, the effect of innovation drive on talent allocation is affected by the degree of government intervention, and there is a double threshold effect of government intervention. The existence of an optimal interval for government intervention can make the effect of innovation drive on regional talent allocation the best.#br#According to the theoretical analysis and conclusions of this paper, the following suggestions are put forward. First, the government should take the innovation drive as the orientation, carry out talent training and investment in a targeted manner; at the same time, it is necessary to build a platform for talent self-improvement, and promote technological innovation bymatching talents and industrial structure. Second, it is important to improve the quality of talent training in universities, strengthen investment in education, and strengthen government intervention in education supply so as to realize the organic integration of talent chain, industrial chainand entrepreneurial chain. Fourth, it is essential to create a good employment environment and a good employment mechanism and environment based on the needs of local industrial development. Fifth, it is necessary to establish a talent information database with accurate talent information, so that it can provide scientific guidance and data support for the introduction of talents and promote the appropriate allocation of talents.#br#
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Received: 15 November 2021
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