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| Financing Costs, Financial Availability and Military-Civilian Science and Technology Collaborative Innovation：AN Analysis Based on the Practice of Zhongguancun and Hunan Province |
| Zeng Lining,Huang Chaofeng |
| （College of Arts and Sciences,National University of Defense and Technology，Changsha 410000，China） |
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Abstract Military-civilian science and technology collaborative innovation(The abbreviation below is "collaborative innovation") is the key to the intersection of the national innovation-driven development strategy, the civil-military integration development strategy and the reform and strengthening of the military strategy, and is a key link to promote the simultaneous enhancement of national defence and economic strength. In the process of collaborative innovation, it’s of great importance to integrate the innovation chain, industry chain, capital chain and policy chain.#br#Under the influence of the financial market structure dominated by large banks in China, the collaborative innovation faces the double financing constraints of high financing costs and low financial availability. As the characteristics of the innovation and business activities of collaborative innovation are common to science and technology, small, medium and private enterprises, their high reliance on bank loans has led to credit discrimination, credit constraints and adverse selection problems, which together lead to the creation of financing constraints. These financial market problems together constrain the support of market capital for the collaborative innovation.#br#Most scholars have affirmed the important role of the "capital chain" in the collaborative innovation. Most of these studies have discussed the role and influence of the "capital chain" from a macroscopic perspective and put forward relevant governance suggestions such as giving play to the leverage of financial funds, broadening financing channels and establishing a service system, but the analysis of the formation root causes of the financing constraints of collaborative innovation is not in-depth enough, and the countermeasure suggestions are rather general and lacking in relevance. The innovation of this paper is that, starting from a theoretical review of the manifestation, formation mechanism and cracking path of the financing constraint of collaborative innovation, Zhongguancun and Hunan province are taken as the representatives of two types of endowment regions, and case studies and experience summaries are made and two different replicable development models are proposed accordingly, which provide practical ideas for financial support of collaborative innovation for other regions with similar development bases. #br#The scale cost advantage of financial intermediaries and the informal signalling mechanism of political connections can effectively alleviate the financing constraints of enterprises in the short term. With the service concept of "market operation and professional cooperation", Beijing Zhongguancun Military-Civilian Integration Industrial Park has played a decisive role in the market and the government's role as a support, effectively alleviating the financing constraints of enterprises in the park and becoming a pioneer among financial intermediaries in the collaborative innovation. The political connection can compensate to some extent for the gap in the role of the market. The government of Hunan province has taken the initiative to strengthen cooperation with policy-oriented financial institutions, strengthen the information release effect and complete the linkage of the chain, so as to complete the financial support for local collaborative innovation through close bank-government cooperation.#br#From the two examples, the key of smoothing the financial chain lies in combining the decisive role of market resource allocation with a better role of the government, so as to realize an effective match between the supply and demand of technology and capital. In areas where technology is concentrated and capital is abundant, the decisive role of the market is given full play, and intermediary service platforms are allowed to become a bridge linking the supply and demand sides of technology with the supply and demand sides of capital for projects. It is suggested to use scientific and technological means such as big data to form a list of updated and complete information on collaborative innovation projects, establish a database of enterprise information to provide statistics on project capital needs, and clarify the investment channels of financial institutions through public release and targeted information pushing on the platform to improve the financial accessibility of collaborative innovation projects. By innovating service content and service methods, breaking down the barriers of the technology by breaking down the barriers of the discourse system between the supply and demand sides, we can find the demand side for good technology projects, reduce the uncertainty of technology transformation and market application, lower the financing cost, and ultimately alleviate the financing constraints faced by the collaborative innovation. In regions with high innovation potential but relatively lagging financial markets, the government's role can be better utilized, and the signaling mechanism of political association can be used to form an effective supplement to the failure of the market's role. China Development Bank which has the advantages of long lending cycles, low costs and stable capital flows, was chosen as the main bank. Business specialists with relevant academic backgrounds and military experience should be selected for mutual communication. The bank and government have signed strategic cooperation agreements and cadres have been posted for exchange, and banks and enterprises have been effectively docked through project screening activities, while banks have formed a "bank consortium" and a regular joint meeting system to alleviate information asymmetry between banks, government and enterprises and to solve the problems of insufficient endowment and weak chain connection.#br#
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Received: 19 March 2021
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