|
|
|
| The Impact of Executives′ Career Concerns on Enterprise Innovation Output |
| Liu Renhuai1,2,Huo Mengjun1 |
| (1.School of Economics and Management, Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu 610031, China;2.Strategic Management Research Center, Jinan University, Guangzhou 510632, China) |
|
|
|
|
Abstract With the advent of the VUAC era, the driving role of innovation has become increasingly prominent. Based on the career concern theory, enterprise life cycle theory and regulatory orientation theory, this paper takes the A-share manufacturing listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2007 to 2017 as research object, explores deeply the relationship between executives′ career concerns and enterprise innovation output. The results show that: executives′ career concerns can significantly promote enterprise innovation output; the relationship between executives′ career concerns and enterprise innovation output is negatively regulated by the enterprise life cycle. When the enterprise life cycle is long, the impact of executives′ career attention on enterprise innovation output will be inhibited; the institutional environment positively regulates the relationship between executives′ career concern and enterprise innovation output. When the institutional environment is better, the impact of executives′ career concerns on enterprise innovation output is more significant; risk-taking plays a mediating role between executives′ career concerns and enterprise innovation output. When the executives′ career concerns are high and risk-taking is strong, the enterprise innovation output will increase.
|
|
Received: 21 September 2020
|
|
|
|
|
|
| [1] HOLMSTROM B. Managerial incentive problems: a dynamic perspective[J]. Review of Economic Studies, 1999,66(1):169-182.[2] 王婧, 吴烨伟, 蓝梦, 等. 高管创新意识与创新绩效——职业生涯关注与财务柔性储备额调节作用[J].中国会计评论, 2017,15(2):173-186.[3] 王婧, 吴烨伟, 蓝梦, 等. 基于高阶梯队理论的电子工业创新绩效影响因素研究——高管认知研究视角[J]. 工业技术经济, 2018,37(3):20-27.[4] LUNDSTRUM L L.Corporate investment myopia: a horserace of the theories[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance, 2002,8(4):353-371.[5] BERTRAND M, SCHOAR A. Managing with style: the effect of managers on firm policies[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2003,118(4):1169-1208.[6] 谢珺, 翟佳丽. CEO职业生涯关注与公司业绩波动性——来自我国上市公司的经验证据[J]. 山西财经大学学报, 2017,39(7):72-83.[7] 黄珊珊, 邵颖红. 高管创新意识、企业创新投入与创新绩效——基于我国创业板上市公司的实证研究[J]. 华东经济管理, 2017,31(2):151-157.[8] 孙建强, 许秀梅, 高洁. 企业生命周期的界定及其阶段分析[J]. 商业研究, 2003，45(18):12-14.[9] HIGGINS E T. Beyond pleasure and pain[J]. American Psychologist, 1997,52(12):1280-1300.[10] PRENDERGAST C, STOLE L. Impetuous youngsters and jaded old-timers: acquiring a reputation for learning[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1996,104(6):1105-1134.[11] YIM S. The acquisitiveness of youth: CEO age and acquisition behavior[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2013,108(1):250-273.[12] 谢珺, 张越月. 基于CEO职业生涯关注的中国上市公司重组行为研究[J]. 山西财经大学学报, 2015,37(6):82-90.[13] NAVEEN L.Organizational complexity and succession planning[J]. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2006,41(3):661-683.[14] GRENIER L. Evolution and revolution as organizations grow[J]. Harvard Business Review, 1972,50(4):37-49.[15] DICKINSON V. Cash flow patterns as a proxy for firm life cycle[J]. Accounting Review, 2011,86(6):1969-1994.[16] 虞义华, 赵奇锋, 鞠晓生. 发明家高管与企业创新[J]. 中国工业经济, 2018，35(3):136-154.[17] 梁莱歆, 金杨, 赵娜. 基于企业生命周期的R&D投入与企业绩效关系研究——来自上市公司经验数据[J]. 科学学与科学技术管理, 2010,31(12):11-17, 35.[18] 周建庆, 梁彤缨, 彭玉莲, 等. CEO异质权力对研发投资的影响——基于企业生命周期的调节作用[J].软科学, 2020,34(3):111-116, 122.[19] O′CONNOR T, BYRNE J. Governance and the corporate life-cycle[J]. International Journal of Managerial Finance, 2015,11(1):23-43.[20] 王锋正, 刘宇嘉, 孙玥. 制度环境、开放式创新与资源型企业转型[J]. 科技进步与对策, 2020,37(5):114-123.[21] 尹美群, 高晨倍. 混合所有制企业控制权、制度环境和研发创新[J]. 科研管理, 2020,41(6):1-8.[22] 任曙明, 李馨漪, 王艳玲, 等.民营参股、制度环境与企业创新[J]. 研究与发展管理, 2019,31(3):59-71.[23] BROWN J R, MARTINSSON G, PETERSEN B C. Law, stock markets and innovation[J]. Journal of Finance, 2013,68(4):1517-1549.[24] 朱焱, 王广. 技术型高管权力与非技术型高管权力对企业绩效的影响——来自中国A股上市高新技术企业的实证检验[J]. 会计研究, 2017(12):73-79, 97.[25] SERFLING, MATTHEW A. CEO age and the riskiness of corporate policies[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance, 2014(25):251-273.[26] 严若森, 陈静, 李浩. 基于融资约束与企业风险承担中介效应的政府补贴对企业创新投入的影响研究[J]. 管理学报, 2020,17(8):1188-1198.[27] LEWIS W A. The theory of economic growth[M]. Southampton: CRC Press, 1955.[28] FUNK U J. Making the most of where you are: geography, networks, and innovation in organizations[J]. Academy of Management Journal, 2014,57(1): 193-222.[29] 何瑛, 于文蕾, 戴逸驰, 等. 高管职业经历与企业创新[J]. 管理世界, 2019,35(11):174-192.[30] BENMELECH E,FRYDMAN C.Military CEOs[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2015,117(1):43-59.[31] 王小鲁, 樊纲, 余静文. 中国分省份市场化指数报告(2016)[M]. 北京:社会科学文献出版社, 2017.[32] 温忠麟, 侯杰泰, 张雷. 调节效应与中介效应的比较和应用[J]. 心理学报, 2005,37(2): 268-274. |
|
|
|
