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| Valuation Adjustment Mechanism,Inconsistent Interest and Innovation Expenditure |
| Liu Zhenxuan1,Zhu Kaojin2,Ke Di1 |
| (1.Business School of Nankai University,Tianjing 300071,China;2.Nanjing Academy of Social Sciences，Nanjing 210018，China) |
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Abstract By applying the geometric Brownian with the jump-diffusion model,the mechanism of the effect of the VAM(Valuation Adjustment Mechanism) on the innovation expenditure is explored from the angle of the difference between the VC investor and the entrepreneur.In combination with the data of the new OTC market,financing events of VC's participation in the period 2010-2018 are collected manually.The method of PSM matching is used to carry out the empirical test.The result shows that VAM can restrain the innovation expenditure of the enterprise,and the negative effect on the innovation investment is more obvious when the target of the VAM is higher and the proportion of the VC is higher.The enterprise is faced with great performance pressure,the signing of VAM aggravates the inconsistency of the interests between the VC and the investor,and the reduce of innovation expenditure can relief the interval inconsistency between them.The proportion of capital cut-off point plays a key role in the effect of VAM and innovation,that is,the lower the cut-off point,the less the effect of the suppression.
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Received: 13 May 2020
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