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| Impact of Political Connections onVenture Capital Strategy |
| Zhou lin,Lin Nan |
| (Business School,Shanghai University of Finance and Economics,Shanghai 200433,China) |
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Abstract From the perspective of capital demander,we use the data of Chinese Growth Enterprise Market listed companies and the data of listed companies in SEM board from October 2009 to December 2016.This article empirically analyzes the impact of political connections on venture capital strategy.The moderating effects of different governance mechanisms are further explored. The results show: (1) Politically connected enterprises tend to choose venture capital at a later stage.(2)Politically connected enterprises tend to choose the syndication investment and the staged investment.(3)Politically connected enterprises tend to choose state-backed,experienced and higher involvement venture capitals.(4)incentive-based mechanisms positively modifes the relation between political connection and venture capital strategy.(5)monitoring-based mechanisms negatively modifes the relation between political connection and venture capital strategy.This study has important implications for the development of the theory and practice of political connection and venture capital.
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Received: 31 May 2019
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