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| The Research of Ownership Structure and Investment Incentive in R&D Partnership |
| Peng Wenmin,Shi Benshan |
| School of Economics and Management,Southwest Jiaotong University,Chengdu 610031,China |
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Abstract In an environment with contractual incompleteness,ownership allocation is important in the R&D partnership.This paper uses the property right approach to explore the ownership structure of innovation and investment decision in a scenario where two parties invest sequentially.The results show that optimal ownership structure varies with bargaining power,and sole ownership by the parties whose bargaining power is relative low can balance their investment incentive.The range of joint ownership based on marketer's bargaining power is increase with relationship-specificity.For an efficiency improvement,we consider an option contract that allocates the ownership according the researcher's investment incentive initially,and the marketer has the right to make the offer of option price.The results of comparisons show that option contract can mitigate underinvestment problem to improve the total surplus.
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Received: 12 November 2016
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Corresponding Authors:
Peng Wenmin
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