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| Economic Analysis on the Barzel Property Rights Theory of Collaborative Innovation Subjects |
| Shi Zhuqin1,3,Cai Ruilin2,Zhu Xianqi1 |
| 1.School of Economics and Management,Taiyuan University of Technology,Taiyuan 030024,China;2.Department of Economics and Management,Changzhou Institute of Light Industry Technology,Changzhou 213164,China;3.School of Economics and Management,Taiyuan University of Science and Technology,Taiyuan 030024,China |
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Abstract Based on the examples of collaborative innovation of Changzhou Science and Education Town, property rights of innovation subjects are economically analyzed by using Barzel's theory of property rights. It reveals that minimal waste is the inner mechanism of collaborative innovation, and all knowledge transactions can be implemented based on the mixture of two mechanisms "contract" and "non-contract". Besides, it finds that transaction cost of collaborative innovation system shows an increasing trend with system change, and it finds that agglomeration of technology resources is in an equilibrium state with moderate scale, complementary function and relatively stable network structure, while "smorgasbord" type of science and technology resources agglomeration cannot stimulate the synergies. On this basis, the following five proposals are put forward, that is to deal with the relationship between collaborative innovation implementation scheme and system construction, to play a leading role of the government, to grasp the equilibrium of collaborative innovation system, to pay attention to the development of intellectual property rights and to implement the mixture of science and technology trading resources.
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Received: 13 September 2016
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Corresponding Authors:
Shi Zhuqin
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