共同机构所有权与企业数字化转型：协同治理抑或私利合谋

doi:10.6049/kjjbydc.2022090574

科技进步与对策

2023, Vol. 40

Issue (20): 87-98 DOI: 10.6049/kjjbydc.2022090574

企业创新管理

本期目录 | 过刊浏览 | 高级检索

共同机构所有权与企业数字化转型：协同治理抑或私利合谋

王新光,盛宇华

（南京师范大学商学院，江苏南京 210023）

Common Institutional Ownership and Corporate Digital Transformation: Collaborative Governance or Self-Interest Collusion?

Wang Xinguang,Sheng Yuhua

(School of Business, Nanjing Normal University, Nanjing 210023, China)

摘要
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摘要学术界关于共同机构所有权对企业决策的影响仍存在分歧。以企业数字化转型为研究视角，基于2008—2020年中国沪深A股上市企业样本，探究共同机构所有权对企业数字化转型的影响。实证结果显示，共同机构所有权显著促进企业数字化转型，支持协同治理假说。机制分析表明，共同机构所有权对企业数字化转型的促进作用主要通过降低代理成本和提升全要素生产率实现。异质性检验结果表明，地区经济发展水平越高、独立董事网络中心度越低或当高管具有金融背景时，共同机构所有权发挥的协同治理效应越显著。结论对进一步激励资本发挥作为生产要素的积极作用和规范监管共同机构所有权行为具有重要启示，同时可为企业数字化转型提供支持性证据与实践建议。

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	王新光
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关键词 ：共同机构所有权, 企业数字化转型, 协同效应, 监督效应

收稿日期: 2022-09-21 修回日期: 2022-12-13

ZTFLH:

F272.7-39

基金资助:国家社会科学基金项目（20BGL139）

作者简介: 王新光（1996—），男，山东聊城人，南京师范大学商学院博士研究生，研究方向为企业经济；盛宇华（1958—），男，江苏连云港人，博士，南京师范大学商学院教授、博士生导师，研究方向为管理决策与领导科学、人力资源和企业产权制度。

引用本文:

王新光,盛宇华. 共同机构所有权与企业数字化转型：协同治理抑或私利合谋[J]. 科技进步与对策, 2023, 40(20): 87-98.
Wang Xinguang,Sheng Yuhua. Common Institutional Ownership and Corporate Digital Transformation: Collaborative Governance or Self-Interest Collusion?. SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY PROGRESS AND POLICY, 2023, 40(20): 87-98.

链接本文:

http://www.kjjb.org/CN/10.6049/kjjbydc.2022090574 或 http://www.kjjb.org/CN/Y2023/V40/I20/87

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